“Pacifism” and Military Expansion of the Abe Administration

2014/06/25

abstract

During his visit to the US in the end of September, 2013, Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, high-profile marketed the so-called “pacifism” on sundry occasions. In a speech made in Hudson Institute based in the US, Abe proposed that Japan should pursue an “active pacifism,” making Japan the “active pacifism standard-bearer.”[①] In another speech in a general debate in the United Nations General Assembly, Abe reaffirmed that Japan will hold the banner of “active pacifism” and take a more active role in UN activities of guaranteeing collective security, including the UN peacekeeping activities,[②] based on this position.

Pacifism hereby seems just like the core concept of Abe administration’s foreign policies. In The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought, the term “Pacifism” is defined as “The belief that all wars are wrong, however good the cause that is being fought for or whatever the threat to one's own country.”[③] Nevertheless, the pacifism hold by Abe has not been promoted as a kind of brief, not to mention that this wording has not clearly excluded the possibility of wars. The Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan’s mainstream media, published an editorial criticizing the ulterior motive of Abe’s “pacifism”, saying that he used the term “pacifism” only as “a means to win public support for his attempt to allow Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense by changing the government’s interpretation of the constitution concerning this issue.” What’s more important, the pacifist creed based on Article 9 of the constitution that Japan has long espoused is far removed from the so-called “active pacifism”. Therefore, “Debate on this important issue should not be clouded by the use of the vague.”[④] After all, the “pacifism” advocated by Abe is hypocritical. His political ideas of this term totally contradict his actions and his inner world of expansionism cannot be hidden even in the beautiful clothing of “pacifism”.

It is expected that through this paper, the components of Abe administration’s pseudo-pacifism, especially its eagerness to adjust the structure of the relationship between the US and Japan, can be full-scale portrayed. On this basis, essence of the “pacifism” — conservatism and expansionism — can be exposed by in-depth analysis on main motivations and theoretical support of the policy formation.

I. Policy orientation of Abe administration’s pseudo-pacifism
Since the Abe administration took the power from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), it has been trying the best to deal with the unfavorable situation and handling carefully the development of the relationship between the US and Japan. Meanwhile, it also stresses the importance of defensive security and the “normalization” of the state, giving prominence to military independence and showing an obvious tendency of “paramilitary conservatism”.[⑤]

All in all, from the angles such as institutional framework, capacity building and political orientation, the Abe administration is promoting Japan to follow the political pattern of military expansion.

First, to achieve the normalization of Japanese military, the Abe administration is eager to break the internal and external institutional shackles represented by Japan’s Peace Constitution and Japan-US Security Treaty.

The Peace Constitution formulated after World War II has been viewed as the shackle that stands in the way of the “normalization” of Japan. After winning the re-election, Abe has been expressing extreme views on amending of the Peace Constitution, ignoring the strongly oppositions from the domestic public and the international community. Moreover, in his first keynote address in the Diet, Abe enticed lawmakers and ordinary people to participate in the discussions on constitutional amendments,[⑥] so as to prevent this sensitive political topic from continuously being a taboo. Taro Aso, vice prime minister as well as the number 2 person in the Abe administration, has even clamored and implied that Japan should emulate the previous Nazi government in German to amend the constitution unconsciously.[⑦] Such unhealthy political environment has already seriously undermined the foundation of the pacifism in Japanese society, that’s why there are always more than half people in Japan who support the amendment of the constitution.[⑧]

Besides the amendment of the Peace Constitution, the adjustment of the “unsymmetrical” alliance between the US and Japan has been attached even more attention. Although most of the conservative politicians in Japan regard this alliance as the cornerstone of Japanese foreign relations, still others view it as the fetter of the normalization of Japanese military. With regard to this, the US-Japan Defense Cooperation has been amended twice respectively in 1978 and 1997. However, to the despair of Japan, the amended defense guideline (signed in 1997 and adopted by the Diet in May 1999) remains a serious shackle to the normalization of Japan and its military expansion, for the reasons as follows: (1) Due to the unchanging of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan revised in 1960, the defense guideline cannot establish a new framework of the cooperation between the US and Japan from the legal perspective. (2) The new revised defense guideline has not authorized Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to take actions independently in reacting to regional emergencies.[⑨]  Besides, the US side also holds a skeptical attitude to the new defense guideline. From the US perspective, even if the new guideline can be implemented smoothly, asymmetry and other problems existing in the defense system still remain unresolved.[⑩] Against such backdrops, the Abe administration tries to promote the revising of the guideline, so as to expand Japan’s military presence and its manageable range. Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (2 2) was held in Tokyo on October 3，2013, in which rewriting the guideline for US-Japanese Defense Cooperation before the end of 2014 has been consented by the US, as Japan wishes.[11] On the other hand, to reduce US suspicions toward Japan, Abe repeatedly declares that Japan will further promote the US-Japan alliance as well as cooperate with countries that share common values and security interests with Japan.[12]  Nonetheless, in fact, Japan’s independent foreign policies are drifting away from the framework of the US-Japan alliance relationship.

Second, raising the term of “pacifism” is aimed to actively expand armaments in both software and hardware aspects and create conditions for the going global of Japanese military. To achieve this goal, the basic strategy of the Abe administration is to carry fire in one hand and water in the other against the background of the limitations of the Peace Constitution.

On the hardware side, it is Abe administration’s urgent priority to increase income in order to expand armaments and the range of its military management. Japan sought for a 3 percent increase in its 2014 budget, the largest rise in 22 years, to 4.82 trillion yen (about $48.2 billion),[13] on August 3, 2013, which is the biggest increase since 1992.[14]

Also, the Abe administration has made a clear strategic guideline of strengthening its arms through advancing technologies, emphasizing the full-scale upgrading of armaments of marine, land and air forces. Following the Hyūga-class helicopter destroyer, Japan’s 22DDH-class (Izumo) helicopter destroyer, which is just an aircraft carrier in disguise, has also been unveiled on August 6, 2013. It is predictable that the maritime combat effectiveness of SDF will be highly improved. Just two months later, Japanese Ministry of Defense showed its maneuver combat vehicle to reporters and plans for the vehicle to be deployed in fiscal 2016.[15] Besides, the Abe administration has also attached importance to the development and application of space technologies. On the one hand, various kinds of reconnaissance satellites have been developed and launched, and stereoscopic and full-range information security network has been established[16]. On the other hand, Japan’s brand-new Epsilon rocket has soared into space successfully, which will lay a solid foundation for the militarization of space with low income and high efficiency in the next stage.

Besides the actively planning on hardware conditions, the Abe administration has also attach much importance to software mechanisms to exclude the restrictions that stand in the way of the development of Japanese military with purposes as follows:

To expand the geo-space of military defense: Japan pretends that the Okinotori reef is its overseas island, and tries to name the reef an “island” to expand the size of its territorial sea and the defense range of SDF. Furthermore, the escalating of territorial disputes between China and Japan on Diaoyu Islands, South Korea and Japan on Dokdo Island (known as Takeshima in Japan), and Russia and Japan on Four Northern Islands (known as the Northern Territories in Japan), also expose wild desires of Japan.

To enhance preventive sense of security: the Abe administration stresses the importance of absolute military strength, preemptive crisis management and control model. For this reason, the Abe administration actively plans to revise Japan’s national defense program outline, and tries to emulate Western countries to form a National Security Committee and makes it the highest decision-making body in dealing with national security affairs.

To find excuses for revising Japan’s right of collective self-defense, and expand permissions and freedom for SDF to use force and create positive conditions for SDF’s overseas deployment. On September 19, 2013, Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobushige Takamizawa expressed that they “can’t simply say (that what goes on) at the opposite end of the globe has nothing to do with Japan,” which implies the possibility of the SDF to use force outside its neighboring countries.[17]
To deliberately neglect, even disregard restrictions of “three principles” on arms exports, and to give green light to Japan’s cooperative research and development as well as the import and export of weapons and manufacturing related technologies. On September 30, 2013, the Abe administration announced that three enterprises, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI) and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation would join the international co-production system of the F-35 stealth fighter which has been identified as SDF’s main fighters in the next stage. Moreover, the British and Japanese governments signed the “Information Protection Agreement” on exchanging military and anti-terrorism classified information in July 2013 and agreed to jointly develop weapon parts.[18]  UK -Japan military cooperation was also positioned by Japan as the second most important military security cooperation after the “US-Japan Military Alliance”.

To expand the partners and scope of military cooperation is just an excuse for the SDF’s “putting to sea”. The expedition of SDF has basically realized normalization and institutionalization under the cover of maritime security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam, etc., and joint military drills with Poland, Britain, the US, South Korea and Australia, etc., as well as the participation in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations.

Third, make no secret of political crisis preaching, indoctrinate conservatism to its citizens, and create a right-wing social environment to the advantage of Japan’s military expansion. Historical issues, especially the misinterpretation of Japan’s defeat apparently become a major tool for Japan to implement conservative political education.

Shortly after assuming the post of prime minister for the second time, Abe published To the New State in which leading the LDP to retake the power was compared to an important battle having the fundamental aim to bring the postwar Japan back to the Japanese people.[19] The ridiculous words betrayed Abe’s intention to evade historical issues and also indicated his strong dissatisfaction with the international political system and Japan’s international status after World War II. Perhaps the remarks of Michiko Hasegawa, an honorary professor of Saitama University, can represent the common “aspiration” of Japan’s conservative forces that the “postwar” leads to the historical guilt Japan should not have, so Japan and the common people should end and liberate from the “postwar” ideological constraints.[20] There is even the viewpoint that Japan can temporarily put aside “historical recognition” issue and then the historical stress will naturally see a sharp decline until Article 9 of the constitution is revised.[21] In this way, history and reality have turned into a burden and the Abe administration is in an attempt to lead the public to accept a “brand new” historical recognition. For this purpose, Abe “took the lead” and once said that he would not inherit the “Murayama’s remarks” intact.[22] Sanae Takaichi, Abe’s entourage within the party and the policy chief for the ruling LDP said that it was necessary to discuss the amendment of the “Murayama’s remarks” concerning the “invasion”.[23]  Owing to the criticism of the domestic public and international community, Abe reluctantly indicated that he would inherit the “Murayama’s remarks” that apologized for the history of Japanese aggression.

Even so, the Abe administration was not reconciled to accept the failure in this matter and then mobilized the public to re-recognize World War II and conducted conservative political education through worshiping at the Yasukuni Shrine. Abe offered sacrifices to the Yasukuni Shrine in the name of the prime minister at the routine worship this April. August 15, 2013 marked the 68th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II. Instead of preventing cabinet members from worshiping, as the Japanese prime minister as well as the LDP leader, Abe even offered sacrifices at his own expense to express his worship. On that day, more than one hundred Japanese lawmakers paid their respects at the Yasukuni Shrine, which sufficiently manifested the aggression of the conservative forces. The research results of Japanese mainstream media Yomiuri Shimbun revealed that up to 46% of the public supported Prime Minister visiting the Yasukuni Shrine while those who “do not support” the worship only accounted for 36% which was 10% lower than the former. Even 42% of the respondents held that the “Kawano talk” which apologized for the treatment of comfort women should be revised. However, only 35% of the respondents opposed to that.[24] Consequently, the right-wing trend becomes increasingly prominent under the control of the Abe administration. Meanwhile, the high approval rating for Abe and the government also turned Abe’s head and he unexpectedly said that he was willing to accept the title of “right-wing militarist”,[25] which further proved the pseudo-pacifism.

II. Formation Causes of Abe Administration’s Pseudo-pacifism
Judging by the policy orientation of the Abe administration, it is clear that the alleged pacifism is no more than pseudo-pacifism which is full of radical expansionism and conservatism. This fundamentally determines the occurrence, development and basic attributes of pseudo-pacifism. The government’s pseudo-pacifism is meant to consolidate the conservative ruling and maintain Japan’s overall national strength and international influence. The core is active military expansion and the essence is the narrow national view and values. Thus, the formation of Abe administration’s pseudo-pacifism is closely related to the development of the conservatism in Japan.

First, the continuing economic recession and the complexity of social issues lead to aggravated crisis awareness in Japan, causing the worry that Japan will be completely marginalized by the international community. Under this background, the Abe administration takes security issues as the main breakthrough to maintain Japan’s overall national strength and its international influence. The government is also eager to construct a Japanesque international security concept, in the hope that the international system can transform in the direction to Japan’s advantage.

The Japanese economy was basically at a standstill after the economic bubble collapsed. The fact that China ended Japan’s reign of 42 years as the world’s second-largest economy in 2010 further intensified the frustration and anxiety in its domestic society. The famous strategist Kenichi Ohmae even exclaimed that the Japanese economy might descend to “10% of China’s” and attach itself to China just like the fly parasitic on cattle.[26] At the same time, Japan’s population also entered the stage of natural decline. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the total population in Japan was 125.96 million in 2012, down by 223 thousand from 2011, which continued the negative population growth for the second year (down by 202 thousand from 2011). Moreover, Japan’s population aged 65 and above reached up to 31.81 million (according to the estimation in September 2013),[27] which marked the dual crisis of ageing and declining population in Japan. Worse still, the influence of the 3/11 Earthquake remains since the pending issue over Fukushima nuclear accident adds to the difficulties in economic recovery. Besides, Japan may be overwhelmed with the guilty because of the worldwide panic about nuclear radiation.

Under this background, the Abe administration chose security issues as a breakthrough and pushed the alleged pacifism, in the hope of maintaining Japan’s overall national strength and reversing the trend of declining national strength. Certainly, this practice can divert the world’s focus on Japan and also help Japan push the development of the international system in its favor. Tomohiko Satake, a researcher at the National Institute for Defense Studies held that Japan’s security concept in the 1990s had changed significantly, namely the narrow national defense under the influence of “purely defensive defense” converted to the broad actions relating to the surrounding situations and international contributions for the sake of international security.[28] Under the flaunty disguise of international security concept, the Abe administration vigorously increased security investment and even aggressively implemented “defensive expansion”. Generally, “defensive expansion” has two important components. The first is spatial expansion which mainly aims to promote its own security by expanding the geographical scope and vast space of military defense. The second is temporal expansion, which is meant to inflict fatal destruction and blow on the opposite side before its effective offense or bereave the opposite side of the ability of posing threats through preemptive military actions. The latter defensive expansion has the significant preventive characteristic. The most typical example in question is the “progressive pre-emption” proposed by former UK prime minister Tony Blair on the issue of “security globality”.[29] The Abe administration adopts, as it were, a mixture of temporal and spatial expansion of which the fundamental aim is to build a legitimate, independent, comprehensive and powerful military organization and security system, and develop Japan into a genuine political and military power through the springboard of military internationalization.

Second, the Abe administration intended to fundamentally reverse the development trend of “China stronger than Japan” and tried the best to maintain Japan’s core status in Asia by taking advantage of the US’s “pivot to the Asia-Pacific” strategy. “The Japanese ‘New Nationalism’ dominates Japan’s foreign strategy, uses the Cold War thinking to take the US’s ‘pivot to the Asia-Pacific’ as the recurrence of the Cold War pattern in Asia and intends to remodel itself in an imaged structure that ‘Japan and US unite against the threat from China’s rise’, which determines the strategic pattern that Japan will follow US to contain China.”[30] Definitely, to support such naive optimism, they have also constructed unique theoretical basis from different dimensions.

The first dimension of their theoretical basis is that China’s rise has been the biggest security threat to Japan and a potential source of regional turbulence. Domestic conservative forces in Japan have been accustomed to following the pattern of the Cold War mentality, misrepresenting the peaceful rise of China and preaching the threat of its neighboring countries such as North Korea. There are even domestic views that China will become a second Soviet Union. Through the preaching of those views, it is expected for them to provoke conflicts between China and the US, so as to make conditions for Japan’s amending of the constitution and gain support from the international community.[31] Some extreme opinions even believe that under the simulation of the nuclear crisis of North Korea, South Korea may seek to develop nuclear weapons. Then, Japan will be in a ring of encirclement constituted by nuclear states including China, South Korea, North Korea and Russia.[32] Against such backdrop, some domestic views preach that Japan should amend its constitution in order to possess nuclear weapons.[33] Moreover, in Spring 2013, Japanese Ministry of Defense carried out a secretly capability assessment on Japanese SDF, paradoxically, within which imaginary emergencies, including China’s “invasion” of the Diaoyu Islands, urgent affairs in Taiwan and North Korea’s missile attacks to Japan, have been set as assumptions.[34] Also, as president of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, Shin'ichi Kitaoka, director of the International University of Japan, has published an article on Yomiuri Shimbun, saying that Japan will never start a war while it is China who has enough motivations to do that.[35] Terumasa Nakanishi, honorary professor at Kyoto University even expressed “frankly” that both China and Japan are top enemies to each other.[36] Such comment deliberately exaggerates tensions between China and Japan.

The second dimension of their theoretical basis is that Japan has been the undoubtable winner in the complex strategic relationship between the US and China. According to a reference report published by US Congress, “Japan’s economic problems in the 1990s and in the first few years of this decade (2000s) have changed the general U.S. perception of Japan as an economic ‘threat’ to one of a country with problems.”[37] Meanwhile, the economic rise of China also prompts US policy-makers to shift their focus from Japan to China,[38], which is helpful for Japan to establish its image of “a weak”.

On the third dimension, the essence of US rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific is to contain China’s sustainably growing national strength and regional influence. From the perspective of Japanese conservative forces, both US strategies in Asia, whether “pivot to Asia” or “focus on Asia”, are obviously targeted at China, and these new strategies are covered by the color of military. Therefore, Japan should take this important opportunity of US pivot to Asia, reverse its downturn and develop its military strength with the help of the US.[39] Hideshi Takesada, a scholar from Japan holds that Japan should strengthen its alliance with the US and enhance the combat effectiveness with the help of its ally, so as to improve Japan’s overall prevention capability.[40] Japanese Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori has written an article on the law governing the SDF, which advocates that Japan must deepen its alliance and cooperation with the US and amend the laws related SDF (right of collective self-defense is among them) to reduce restrictions through narrating the Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan, nuclear crisis of North Korea and dramatic changes in East Asia.[41] Also, Japan’s Ministry of Defense strongly advocates letting SDF play a more important role to help US troops in their redeployments in Asia and Europe and reducing local societies’ burden caused by their stationing.[42] After all, Japan wants to secretly expand its military strength “illegally” under the cover of the US-Japan alliance.

Third, against the backdrop of the popularity of domestic conservative forces in Japan, political voices of anti-Yoshida Doctrine rise rapidly. These voices preach the so-called “security interdependence” to support Abe administration’s intention of military expansion and further “revising” the imbalance in the US-Japanese relations. Just like Daniel Sneider said, “The Yoshida Doctrine retains an iconic status in Japan. But below the surface, many Japanese of all political stripes were never comfortable with a strategy of reflexive dependence on the United States.”[43] Yoshiki Hidaka, a scholar from Japan, even hold the banner of amending the Japan-US Security Treaty, advocating that the security treaty only applies to the bilateral relationship after the end of World War II instead of current reality.[44] To entirely eliminate the imbalance in the relationship, anti-Yoshida Doctrine political forces constantly preach the structural drawbacks of the US-Japan alliance domestically.

Firstly, containment from the US-Japan alliance stands in the way of the normal development of Japanese military. Although the alliance has provided important security guarantees to Japan after World War II, the       essence of it is that the US restricts Japan’s military reconstruction and expansion. Therefore, only by substantially revising the relationship between the US and Japan, can Japanese military development goes back to the normal track. When scholars, including Ellis S. Krauss, compare the political economy of US-Japan, US-German, and US-UK relations from the perspective of political economy, the US has been linked with “MedUSA,” implying that it is dangerous to be beside this global power.[45] It is noted that viewpoints advocating the “alliance restrictions” does not contradict with the views on “MedUSA”, because the core ideas of both are vigilances and worries toward the US on whether it will maximize its interests under the auspices of the hegemonic stability theory.

Secondly, the US does not want to be involved in military conflicts revolving Japan passively while Japan’s interests might be undermined because it is easier to be involved in military conflicts provoked by the US. The Diaoyu Islands dispute is among the examples. The US admits Japan’s right of administration on the Diaoyu Islands, nevertheless, it will be very hesitant to militarily intervene in a dispute stirred up by Japan toward China.[46] Therefore, on one hand, the US can provide high security guarantees to Japan, on the other hand, Japan may be embroiled in regional disputes caused by its alliance with the US. The latter is more meaningful to Japan than the former. Hence, Japan should keep a distance from the US and develop its military strength “independently”. Meanwhile, Japan should also reduce its dependence on the US as soon as possible and be prepared for the increasing of the difficulties caused by its sheltered status.[47]

Thirdly, Japan is afraid of being marginalized by the US, which may lead to an invalid US-Japan Security Treaty. Japan will be disregarded and deported outside the US diplomatic considerations then. Atsuyuki Sassa, a Japanese scholar, has expressed that it is a worrisome viewpoint that places hope on China instead of Japan to cooperate with the US to jointly defend the security in the Pacific; however, recently, politicians who hold such opinion are increasing.[48] To prevent such guess from coming true, the US-Japan Security Treaty should be amended. At the same time, to prevent the US from discarding the treaty unilaterally, the treaty should have a validity period.[49] Apparently, such viewpoints hope to enhance and deepen the US-Japan Security Treaty, however, essentially, they are aimed to create conditions for Japan to rid itself from military restrictions from the US. As long as the treaty becomes invalid, Japan will have the right to refuse to renew it and expand its military strength “independently”.

In short, all opinions, whether supporting the views on “dependency theory”, “alliance restrictions” or “Japan’s lack of trust toward the US,” all share a common ground that the intention of Japan is to shy away the restrictions of the Peace Constitution, develop its own military strength and re-shape Japanese image as a military power.

III. Japan’s Policy Direction under the Cover of Pseudo-Pacifism
Through in-depth analysis on Abe administration’s military expansion policy and the deep-rooted motivations of it, the real purpose behind the pseudo-pacifism is glaringly obvious. It is imaginable that the future policy direction of the Abe administration will follow this path of pseudo-pacifism that is filled with characteristics of expansionism and conservatism.

From the perspective of Hans Joachim Morgenthau, representative of realism, there’s strong link between national and international politics. Such link can make the countries stand on the forefront of the power game, as well as make them lose the capability to actively participate in core competitions.[50] Conservative forces have portrayed Japan as a country whose domestic security is being seriously threatened. With the help of the so-called “pacifism,” the Abe administration hopes to link such image of Japan with the global environment in which the peaceful overall situation are mixed with regional conflicts, in order to re-establish Japan’s standpoint in the new round of transformation of international political system. What’s more, Tokyo does not seek complete independence although it has already developed to an interdependent actor. Instead, it prefers to position itself in bilateral, multilateral and global mechanisms.[51] Just like what Abe remarked in a speech delivered in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Japan’s location can be understood in two levels: First, geographically, it is located in two important emerging areas — Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific; second, in international politics, it plays a dominant role in international institutional reforms. The word “institutional” refers to the rules of trade management, investment, intellectual property, labor and environment.[52]. Obviously, Abe’s plan for Japan’s new regional and global strategy meets the opinion of Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski, Polish American political scientist, geostrategist, and author of the book The Grand Chessboard in which he expresses that “A politically more influential Japan, especially one that seeks global recognition (for example, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council), cannot avoid taking stands on the more critical security or geopolitical issues affecting world peace.”[53]

On the other hand, the foundation of Abe administration’s so-called “pacifism” is still the US-Japan alliance and the US-Japanese Security Treaty still restrict the foreign strategy and military expansion of Japan. Nevertheless, the Abe administration will never publicly challenge US dominant role. It is worth noting that although the imbalance in the relationship between the US and Japan cannot be completely eliminated, Abe administration’s radical policies will still exert influence in gaining more space for Japan in the alliance system. Of course, the precondition of this is the admission from the US. Therefore, it is predictable that Japan will try to make breakthrough in the following aspects: (1) Amend the constitutional interpretation of the right of collective self-defense, so as to increase the feasibility and maneuverability for the SDF to join military operations and give them the legitimacy to join military conflicts that do not directly involve Japan’s interests. (2) Amend the “three principles” on arms exports to join the Western weapons development and global procurement system headed by the US. (3) More actively participate in the multilateral operations, including peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, anti-piracy operations led by the United Nations on scale and frequency. (4) Establish overseas bases in the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and even the whole world and deploy its military forces in all domains to expand Japan’s international military presence. (5) Increase its rear support to the US and other allies. Many questions are produced then: What’s the marginal range of its support? Will it provide arms and ammunitions? Or will it just provide non-weapon materials supply and logistics? Also, as to the “rear support”, what does it mean by “rear”? Once the US or Japan’s other allies involve in regional military conflicts, how to define the rear area then? It means the area that away from the core area of the conflict or just the place inside the core area? (6) Gradually amend the Article 9 of the Peace Constitution, so as to legitimize Japan’s SDF and its expansion of its military strength and influence and realize Japan’s right of defense autonomy. This is one of the deep-rooted purposes of the raising of “pacifism”.

Finally, the actual appeal of Abe administration’s pseudo-pacifism mainly focuses on China’s peaceful rise and the consequent transformation of global system. To contain China’s momentum of sustainable developing and make the changes in regional and international situation meet the interests of Japan, the Abe administration promoted the so-called “pacifism”. On the surface, this method is aimed to construct a Japanesque universal value in the international community. However, in essence, this term is raised to make tools to contain China both theoretically and morally and rally more allies to guard against China. To achieve this goal, the Abe administration even hopes to place China on trial of the international morality and the rule of law with the help of others’ identification with its so-called “pacifism”. Moreover, the Abe administration also constructs the so-called “alliance of democratic countries”, provoking disputes between China and surrounding countries, intervening in China’s internal affairs, and maintaining close relationships with separatist forces that advocate independence of Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. The deep-rooted purpose of the term is to make China isolated and slow down China’s pace of development. It is worth noting that Japan’s choice of joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) has already showed its political mentality which remains staying in the Cold War era and is trapped in economic and military problems. Guided by such outdated mentality, the real purpose of Japan is to strengthen its cooperative relationship with the US to jointly deal with China’s military posture.[54] Therefore, as long as the domestic politics is in the hands of dangerous conservative forces, the basic tendency of containing China and the tensions between China and Japan will remain unchangeable. Also, as Japan’s pseudo-pacifism and military expansion continue to swell, the political contradictions between China and Japan are very likely to be intensified, which calls for attention of those of insight from both China and Japan.

 

author：