Migration Trends in the Mediterranean:A Challenge for the European Union

2013/06/20

abstract

Border security has taken on a Community dimension. National border authorities in Europe are being challenged as never before. This is mainly due to the new political, social, economic and security-related phenomena that Europe faced in the last 10-15 years, including a growth in migration, increased international travel, international trade and heightened security demands, especially after September 11, 2001.

Hundreds of millions of people are travelling around the globe. Geopolitical instabilities in poor regions, religious and ethnic conflicts are increasing in number and scale. The external borders of the European Union are crossed by more than 300 million travellers each year, and the trend is increasing. According to a 2007 report to the European Parliament by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), up to 120,000 migrants are able to enter the EU illegally each year. Τhe Mediterranean Member States in particular, are by their position particularly vulnerable to illegal immigration on a scale they can barely cope with. In terms of migratory pressures at the sea borders Spain registered 16,000, Malta 2,000, Italy 35,000 and Greece 32,000 illegal border crossings in 2008, while figures for other Member States were negligible. Current migration trends suggest that special focus needs to be placed on the EU’s southern maritime borders, in order to achieve integrated border management structures that would safeguard one of the most tangible and appreciated benefits the Community has brought to its citizens: free movement of people.

This paper will address not only the principles which should guide the involvement and activities of Frontex as such, but also whether the overall political mandate and the operational planning and contingencies need to be better defined and extended. At the same time, the paper will assess a number of possible proposals/recommendations – organisational, operational, technical - for the development of the Mediterranean area into a space of security and safety in concomitance with the fundamental human rights and the principles of democracy and the rule of law.
II. The Mediterranean Maritime Border Environment

1. General Characteristics and Challenges

On its southern borders, Europe has a coastline of 34, 109 km long.[①] The Mediterranean, Europe’s largest shared sea, constitutes a source of both prosperity and turmoil, where people and goods interchange on a daily basis. Nearly 25% of the world’s sea-borne oil traffic and 30% of the world’s sea-borne trade transits through its waters.[②]

The recent political upheavals in the Arab world have underlined the importance of this ‘proximity factor’: societal change in the Maghreb and the Middle East affects Europe in a number of ways. The European Union must find ways to face the risk of a possible disruption in oil supplies, cope with high percentages of irregular migration flows and asylum seekers, while elaborating, in the meantime, a revamped regional response providing the means to cooperate with its southern partners in the light of yet unknown political, social and economic outcomes.

2. Reinforced Southern Maritime Borders

Management in Europe’s Mediterranean borders is currently based on a set of principles and objectives set out by the European Commission in its 2006 communication. All of these recommendations constitute an on-going process, aiming at securing Europe’s border. In this respect, special attention is given to the upgrading of Frontex and to the need to provide the agency with all the necessary means, i.e. access to information, pooling of technical equipment under the agency’s management, cooperation with international organisations, continuous control and surveillance operations in the Mediterranean, in order to produce more targeted risk analyses and to become more effective.

Besides that, the European notion of an integrated border management platform is concomitant to the creation of specific tools, such as a permanent coastal patrol network, regional command centres, a common European surveillance system, pooling of experts etc. At the same time, the use of European financial means should be maximised, while particular priority is given by the Commission to the defining and the determination of the methods that should be used for the purpose of intercepting vessels at sea.[③]

III. Irregular Migration and Trafficking

During 2010, a total number of 104,049 detections of illegal border-crossings has been registered at Europe’s sea and land external borders. This total is approximately the same as it was for 2009. Compared to 2008, when the number of illegal detections reached a total of 159,092, the decreasing levels registered in the last couple of years (2009/2010) remain practically unchanged. It is, however, interesting to underline the fact that the year 2010 was marked by visa liberalisation in the Western Balkans, a consequent increase in passenger flows and a considerable diverging modus operandi as far as it concerns irregular migration routes, which suggests that immigration patterns are neither homogeneous nor unique in kind, i.e. origin of migrants, chosen routes, differentiation between economic immigration and asylum seekers etc.

1. Shifting Migration Trends

Migration trends in the greater Mediterranean region are not the same as they were some years ago. Migration routes have shifted from the western to the eastern part of the basin: irregular migration towards Europe through western Africa has considerably decreased, while an abrupt increase of migration flows has been recorded in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly in the Greek-Turkish land border. Greece, throughout 2010, has become the EU country receiving the greatest bulk of irregular immigrants and asylum seekers and Turkey the main transit country for irregular migration.[④]

The land and sea border between Greece and Turkey represents Europe’s main challenge concerning irregular migration. Focus should be placed on the fact that, between 2009 and 2010, detections of illegal border-crossing by migrants who invariably intended to transit Greece to settle in other member states, increased by 45%. Only for 2010, the Greek authorities reported 47, 706 detentions at the land border with Turkey, while in the Canary islands, for example, the highest number of detentions ever recorded was 30 000, in 2006, and 31 000, in 2008, in the island of Lampedusa in Italy.[⑤]

Currently, EU Mediterranean states find themselves under paramount pressure: the events that have taken place in the basin’s Southern states have generated not only hopes for a better future, but have also been the cause for a voluminous wave of people fleeing economic precarity and insecurity in the North African states into Europe. Inevitably, Italy, Malta, Greece and Cyprus are directly exposed to these migratory pressures and are called to find ways to deal both with irregular migrants and with asylum seekers needing international protection. Their efforts should not only be limited to measures taken on a national level, but should also be supervised and sponsored, according to the spirit of European solidarity, by the EU as a whole.

It is not going to be an easy task. By April 2011, over 23,000 persons have arrived from Tunisia in the island of Lampedusa,[⑥] while the number of people leaving Libya in destination to Europe and to other non-EU countries (mainly Tunisia and Egypt) increases day by day.[⑦] Since the beginning of 2011, a total of 650,000 people have left Libya in order to avoid violence and conflict. The European Commission estimates that a great number of these people represent economic immigrants and should be readmitted back to their respective countries of origin.[⑧] Yet, measures should be taken in order to help the persons in need such as refugees, asylum seekers and temporary displaced persons.

2. Modus Operandi

Records of irregular migration in the Mediterranean region indicate that border crossing through sea was favoured over land crossing. Yet, recent numbers suggest an increase in land border detections, rising from 55% in 2009 to 86% in 2010.[⑨] Crossing the border in small groups, often in a short distance from the check-points represents part of the “voyage strategy”, while the real identity of most immigrants is not easily determined as they penetrate European soil with false or no documents at all, in order to avoid return procedures. Afghans or Palestinians crossing to Greece, for example, have less chances of being readmitted to Turkey and are well aware of the possibility to be arrested by the Greek police: detention is considered “a stopover on their journey into the EU”.[⑩]

The question of proper identification points to the dual challenge the EU authorities are facing, that is achieving the distinction between economic migrants and people having legitimate claims. Many member states have reported migrants applying for asylum only when arrested. A relevant increase in asylum applications from Afghan nationals has also been observed in Germany, particularly after the Court ruling concerning the suspension of returns to Greece (country of entry to EU soil). At the EU level, during 2010, between the second and the third quarters, asylum applications increased by 28%, the highest percentage rise ever registered since regular data collection began in 2008.[11]

These facts on the ground suggest the need for a coordinated effort, on an EU level, aiming at tackling migration and at offering, at the same time, international protection to people really in need. For this to materialise, efforts should concentrate on pinpointing the mechanisms and tools that will facilitate identification procedures. This entails not only coordination between member states (i.e. creation of National Coordination Centres) but also between the national authorities themselves (i.e., well-functioning reception centres).

3. Future Trends

It would not be safe to make hasty conclusions on future trends concerning migration in the Mediterranean basin. Data collection thus far designates rather fluctuating operational patterns. For example, in the first three months of 2010 a significant decrease was observed in all irregular immigration indicators on the EU’s external borders. Detections at sea were less than one-tenth of the peak level of 33,600 detections reported during the third quarter of 2008. This was generally due to reduced employment opportunities for the immigrants because of the economic crisis in Europe; to effective asylum policies and restriction measures adopted by member states; and to the conclusion of bilateral agreements between EU member states and key countries of origin[12].

Yet, during the same period, detections rose in the land border between Greece and Turkey, suggesting a shift far from the traditional access through sea transportation. Moreover, the recent events in the Arab world have caused massive waves of movement towards Europe, causing, as it will be analysed later on, frustration between member states and cracks on European solidarity. During the first days of June 2011, hundreds of Syrian nationals have fled the country, across the border into Turkey, fearing major assaults from the security forces loyal to President Bashar Al-Assad, giving rise to a probable risk of refugee crisis.[13]

Even if patterns change, immigration waves are likely to affect Europe in the years to come. In recent years, the rise of far-right parties throughout the continent highlights inflexible attitudes towards migration, indicating that European perceptions towards the other are more and more security-related, be it safety (fear of terrorism and perceptions of Islam) or employment. In this context, Europe is turning into what many analysts characterise as fortress Europe, alienating itself from the “open borders” notion.[14]

IV. The Case of Greece

Certainly, irregular immigration waves affect directly the EU’s southern member states. Their inquietudes were quite evident when, in February 2011, the Home Affairs and Internal Security Ministers of Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain issued a joint communiqué underlining their concerns regarding the humanitarian situation in North Africa and the consequent migratory flows.

Their call on a more pronounced European action was reiterated on the 19th of April 2011, when the Mediterranean EU states demanded a strongest financial and operational support, according to the spirit of European solidarity, in their efforts to handle immigration waves from the Maghreb.

Migratory pressures are not equally distributed throughout the EU, not even between the Mediterranean member states themselves. In 2006, Spain and Italy were over-exposed to migration flows, while in 2010, Greece had to face colossal groups of people seeking refuge in the EU.

In 2011, particular pressure has been put on Greece, shifting the migration burden away from the Western Mediterranean region. Frontex’s risk analysis network underlined in January that the increase registered in detections of irregular border- crossings at the EU level was “almost exclusively the result of increased pressure in Greece, where around four-fifths of all detections in the EU were reported”[15]. From January to October 2010 the Greek authorities reported over 75 000 detections across the EU external borders in Greece, 39,000 of them were registered on the land border with Turkey, one of the highest numbers ever recorded at EU level.[16]

Most of these detections take place at a single 12.5 km stretch near the Greek city of Orestiada, while most of the apprehended immigrants are of Afghan, Iraqi and Pakistani origin. A rise has also been recorded in Algerian nationals during 2010.[17]

Greece was inevitably incapable of managing these considerable migratory pressures. This is why the first Rapid Border Intervention Team (Rabit) was deployed in the northern part of Greece in November 2010. The main objective of this real life deployment was to assist Greek border authorities in their efforts to prevent irregular immigration. Commitments, both in material and human resources, were made by member states. These regarded, inter alia, the deployment of 175 specialist border-control personnel which undertook the responsibility of monitoring and securing the Greek-Turkish border, conducting interviews in order to discover the nationality and identity of immigrants, engaging in intelligence activities for criminality exposure related to human trafficking.[18]

Rabit operation came to an end on March 2011 and was replaced by joint operation Poseidon, active in the area before the deployment of Rabit. During its operational period, Rabit managed to achieve, according to Frontex, its main objective: securing Europe’s borders.

Poseidon, which initially was destined to cover this border, was widened, including also the Greek island of Crete, in order to tackle migration challenges originating from Libya. Since its beginning, operation Poseidon land has registered a decrease in illegal border-crossings in the border between Greece and Turkey. From 1 January 2011 until 24 March, 5,281 migrants were detected, in comparison with 8,054 arrivals just in November and December 2010. The majority of migrants are of Afghan (25%), Pakistani (14%) and Bangladeshi (12%) origin.[19]

Moreover, Greece is the host country of the first Frontex Operational Office, with the clear-cut objective of providing regionally-based support for Frontex coordinated activities. This pilot project aims at being implemented also in other crucial regions in Europe’s periphery. It constitutes the result of debates regarding the enhancement of the agency’s operational capacity on border management, joint operations in the Mediterranean and situational awareness in the greater region.

Recent developments concerning migratory influx, have naturally shifted the EU’s attention towards Greece, Europe’s weakest – and currently economically more vulnerable - link. At the same time, Greece, its national immigration policy and Frontex’s activities in its territory are being scrutinized by international and European NGOs, which not only lament the lack of reliable quantitative data on irregular immigration but also stress out the Greek authorities’ inefficiency in dealing with migrants, pointing to human rights violations and excessive promotion of a specific rhetoric concerning the rise of unemployment due to immigrant influxes, insecurity and unjustifiable burden on the public services.

Greece is particularly fingered for its deficiencies in its asylum procedures. In fact, because Greece could not develop a policy for expulsion towards Turkey, like Spain has done with Morocco or Italy with Libya and Tunisia, migrants chose to cross the land border between Greece and Turkey and then move on to Western Europe via sea through Italy, or from the Balkans.

In January 2011, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that Belgium should not have deported an asylum seeker to Greece under Dublin II, because Greece failed to implement EU common standards rendering the basic assumption of Dublin II on the safe transfer of asylum seekers between EU member countries practically meaningless. Germany has also stopped sending asylum seekers in Greece, in order not to impose, as officially claimed, further burden on the Greek asylum system.[20]

Greece’s main violations of the Dublin II convention concern deficiencies in its asylum procedure and detention conditions. In reality, less than 1% of asylum applications are granted in Greece,[21] while the authorities have constantly been accused of the country’s asylum procedures.[22]

Concerning detention centres, Greek authorities are often blamed of not meeting the minimum standards for humane detention conditions. During the first nine months of 2010 the detention centres of the Evros and Rodopi regions, in the Northern part of the country near the land border with Turkey, had to manage 31,219 irregular migrant arrivals as opposed to 8,787 in the first nine months of 2009.[23] This considerable increase in numbers is coupled with the deficiencies of the Greek system: opaque allocation of European funds, unsuitability of infrastructures, incapacity to deal with sanitary problems, limited staff, overcrowded centres, etc.[24]

V. EU Policy Initiatives and Developments

Frontex’s role is limited to provide support and expertise to the EU member states. As such, its involvement in on-the-ground operational activity is limited to the coordination of specific joint operations of member states’ border-guard authorities. Frontex neither replaces national border-guard duties, nor does it have independent executive powers. For its operations it remains largely dependent on member states’ assets and personnel.

1. Frontex Activities: Joint Operations

The increase in funding is first reflected in increased interest and costs connected with joint border operations, which cater for more than 75% of Frontex's total operational costs. These operations are at the core of Frontex's activities and the main interest for many stakeholders, especially Member States with exposed external borders. HERA, MINERVA, NAUTILUS and POSEIDON have been the most important operations coordinated by the Agency.[25]

Responding to the volatile situation in North African states, Frontex has decided to extend its operational area for its on-going joint operation Poseidon Sea[26] and to launch, on February 2011, joint operation Hermes 2011 in order to tackle migration waves of people arriving at the Italian island of Lampedusa. The JO was the result of a demand of the Italian authorities to Frontex. Italy requested not only assistance in the form of a joint operation, but also, a targeted risk analysis on the possible future

scenarios of the increased migratory pressure. During the first two months of 2011, approximately 6,000 irregular migrants have reached the Italian shores.[27]

2. Institutional Developments

Since Frontex’s foundation, its tasks have not changed drastically. Nevertheless, considering the very broad mission statement, the interpretation of those tasks and the adherence tools are not static.

A. RABITs

In July 2007 the Council amended the founding Regulation to include the Rapid Border Intervention Team (RABIT) mechanism.[28] The amendment enlarged the already existing authority to technically support Member States that request so. The Agency may now draw up an expert pool, consisting of some 450 national experts which may be deployed. They are made available at short notice of up to five working days to any Member State whose borders are under urgent and exceptional strain from irregular migration. The degree of commitment has also been stepped up by suggesting an obligation to contribute. Joint missions, however, are still governed by the host Member State and consequently Frontex merely contributes to the coordination and the financing of the mission. As we have already mentioned, a Rabit operation has been deployed in the Northern part of Greece.

B. Agreements with Third Countries

A further development, though not as institutionalized as the former, is the continuous contact that Frontex establishes with neighbouring and third countries. The 2006 JHA Council clearly favoured such an approach since it included these activities in the definition of integrated border management. The founding Regulation provides for cooperation with the authorities of third countries competent in matters covered by the Regulation. In practice, such cooperation consists of purely technical arrangements such as exchange of information and experiences as well as training cooperation. Consequently, all references to politics have to be removed when drafting documents for cooperation.

As of February 2011, Frontex had concluded working arrangements with the competent authorities of 14 third countries: the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Croatia Moldova, Georgia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States, Montenegro, Belarus, Canada and Cape Verde as well as with the CIS Border Troop Commanders Council and the MARRI (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative) Regional Centre in the Western Balkans.[29]

C. Frontex’s Enhancement

In February 2008, the Commission released an assessment of Frontex[30]. The main issues in the evaluation were: whether Frontex should take on board other tasks related to border management (i.e. customs); how well the teams deployed by Frontex are functioning, and if there is a need for a European border guard system. The assessment examined the Agency’s progress since becoming operational in October 2005, recommended improvement measures that can be taken in the short term, and outlined a long-term vision for the future development of Frontex.

On 24 February 2010, the Commission presented its proposal to strengthen Frontex.[31] The objective of the proposal is to adapt the Regulation, in the light of the evaluations carried out and practical experiences, to clarify the mandate of the Agency and to address identified shortcomings. It reflects core objectives and activities of the Agency with the aim at: revising existing provisions on the use of technical equipment in joint operations, including the mechanisms for contributions from the Member States of such equipment; creating or revising mechanisms to improve the availability of border guards in joint operations; revising the role of the Agency in preparing, coordinating and implementing operations, including with regard to the sharing of tasks between the Agency and the Member States; expanding the mandate of the Agency in cooperating with third countries on border management; mandating the Agency to collect and process personal data; revising the mandate of the Agency as concerns return operations; and mandating the Agency to contribute to evaluating the performance of Member States in the area of border management.

The goal of the Commission has been for the new framework to ensure that Frontex can provide appropriate technical and human resources in the framework of joint border patrols. In February 2010, the Council has agreed on 29 measures for reinforcing the protection of the external borders and combating irregular immigration.[32] The measures focused on the activities of Frontex, on the development of the European Surveillance System (EUROSUR), on the solidarity and the integrated management of external borders by the member states and on the cooperation with third countries. In May 2011,[33] the Commission proposed a series of short-term measures in order to cope with the crisis in Northern Africa and the resulting displacement of populations while reiterating both the need for a more effective border control management strategy and the need for a constructive dialogue with Europe’s southern neighbours.

VI. Recommendations for an Effective and Flexible Strategy

Frontex has enjoyed some success in its short existence.[34] Under the current circumstances, Frontex seems to represent an adequate tool for tackling irregular immigration in the Mediterranean. An enhanced agency, coupled with the political will of member states, could offer the EU an effective mechanism for external border control management. A dual effort is needed: Europe should tackle the push factors by enhancing cooperation, on a bilateral level, with countries of origin in the Mediterranean littoral states and beyond and undertake measures that will allow the preservation and the stability of the European social model. Bearing this in mind, the EU (and Frontex) should:

-    Respect and promote human rights. Since Frontex can only act with member states’ approval, it is associated with human rights misguidings that may occur when member states’ authorities undertake border control missions. In this respect, the agency should contribute in improving national border guard sensitivity towards human rights protection issues. Within this framework, particular importance should be given to cooperation with the EU fundamental human rights agency and the European asylum support office.

-    Continue to develop operational and technical cooperation and conclude working arrangements with neighbouring Mediterranean third countries and key countries of origin. At the same time, EU member states should conclude bilateral agreements with countries of origin or transit, following the example of Italy and Spain. The EU should facilitate, in this respect, on a case by case basis, preferential access to visas for third country nationals. Accordingly, member states should provide legal avenues for migration, i.e. through seasonal work or circular migration.

-    Encourage the creation of national coordination centres at all member states located at the southern maritime and eastern land borders of the EU. Accordingly, Frontex should implement the pilot project on the establishing a communication network among the national coordination centres. The subsequent regionalization of the agency could translate into a strengthened role and mandate.

-    Work towards the highest possible integration of different aspects of EU maritime policy, such as control, police, port surveillance, customs, trade, fishing, etc. Common standards should be developed to promote technical interoperability and to facilitate the coordination of joint European operations. The European Patrols Network should be further developed and extended to cover further maritime areas for facilitating the cooperation between authorities and member states.

-    Take concrete steps towards a more interoperable surveillance system to bring together existing monitoring and tracking systems used for maritime safety and security, SAR activities, protection of marine environment, fisheries control, control of external borders and other law enforcement activities for enhancing the situational awareness and cost effectiveness. Surveillance information collected should within the legal framework be shared between law enforcement and military authorities to avoid duplication and to be cost effective.

-    Proceed with determination to establishing – as required under Directive 2005/35 – a European Coastguard.[35] The Commission should undertake a feasibility study followed by a specific proposal. The concept of a coordinated EU-wide coastguard agency has significant value, not least through its ability to provide consistent levels of service in areas such as search and rescue capabilities, pollution prevention and control, places of refuge, drug traffic, smuggling, irregular immigration. A European Coastguard should be required to provide to provide guidance and assistance in providing the same levels of training, resources and facilities across all member states and establish common standards for communication and operations procedures.

-    Assist the EU in adopting all the necessary tools for an integrated European Border Management strategy, such as the creation of a system, which could enable the automated verification of travellers’ identity without the intervention of border guards or the electronic authorisation to travel as an alternative to requiring a visa.

-    Frontex is an overly-politicised body whose compliance with the principle of legality may be open to debate. In general terms, the tasks carried out by the Agency need to strictly comply with the principle of legality. Frontex remains vulnerable in its current form because of the predominance of the principle of dependence on Member States’ solidarity, and its sensibility towards emergency-driven. What, however, does Frontex indicate is that EU response to the challenge of irregular migration has mostly focused on controls and deterrence. It is primarily a strategy of ‘hard’ policy measures, aimed at ‘combating’ irregular migrants and containing migratory flows. In this respect, Frontex should functions alongside the existing EU’s policies of cooperation with third countries performed in the spirit of human rights respect and promotion of democracy and the rule of law.
[①] House of Lords, “Frontex: the EU External Borders Agency,” European Union Committee, 9th Report of Session, 2007-08, p.17.
[②] European Commission, “Integrated Maritime Policy in the Mediterranean,” Brussels, 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/mediterranean_en.html on May 2011.
[③] Ibid.
[④] Frontex, Annual Risk Analysis 2011, Warsaw, April 2011, p. 5.
[⑤] Ibid., p. 14.
[⑥] During winter, the island has a stable population of 5 000 inhabitants.
[⑦] Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1805, 2011.
[⑧] Communication de la Commission au Parlement européen, au Conseil, au Comité économique et social européen et au Comité des régions sur la migration, Bruxelles, 4 mai 2011, COM(2011) 248 final, p.5.
[⑨] Frontex, Annual Risk Analysis 2011, p. 27.
[⑩] Ibid., p. 28.
[11] FRAN Quarterly, Issue 3, July-September 2010, p. 20.
[12] Frontex, “Irregular Immigration Hits New Low in First Quarter 2010, Facilitator Detection up 13%,” July 7, 2010, Frontex news releases, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/ news_ releases /art68.html on May 2011.
[13] Sebnem Arsu and Laim Stack, “Fearing Assault, More Syrians Flee into Turkey,” June 9, 2011, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/world/middleeast/10syria.html?_r=2 on June 2011.
[14] Ilies Maria, “Irregular Immigration Policy in the European Community: Action at all Stages of the Irregular Migration Flow (WP),” Real Instituto Elcano, Working Paper, No. 38, 2009, p. 3.
[15] FRAN Quarterly, Issue 3, July-September 2010, p. 3.
[16] Frontex, “Current Migratory Situation in Greece,” November 29, 2010, http://www.frontex. europa.eu/rabit_2010/background_information.
[17] FRAN Quarterly, Issue 3, July-September 2010, pp. 12-13.
[18] For this operation, Frontex had at its disposal technical equipment from CRATE (Centralised Record of Available Technical Equipment). This included 1 helicopter, 1 bus, 5 minibuses, 19 patrol cars, 9 thermo vision vans, 3 Schengen buses and 3 office units. See Frontex, “Greece RABIT 2010 Deployment,” http://www.frontex.europa.eu/rabit_2010/background_information.
[19] Frontex, “Update to Joint Operation Poseidon 2011,” March 26, 2011, http://www.frontex. europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art104.html.
[20] Toby Vogel, “Expulsion of Asylum Seekers to Greece ‘Illegal’,” January 21, 2011, European Voice, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2011/january/expulsions-of-asylum-seekers-to- greece-illegal-/70019.aspx.
[21] Migreurop, Aux fronτières de l’Europe, contrôles, Enfermements, Expulsions, Rapport 2009-2010, http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/Migreurop-2010-FR.pdf, p. 76.
[22] Amnesty International, “The Dublin II Trap, Transfers of Asylum Seekers to Greece,” http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR25/001/2010/en/e64fa2b5-684f-4f38-a1bf-8fe1b54d83b5/eur250012010en.pdf on May 2011.
[23] Thanos Maroukis, “Irregular migrants in the Detention Centres of Northern Greece – Aspects of a Humanitarian Crisis,” November 19, 2010, http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/irregular-migrants-in- the-detention-centres-of-northern-greece-–-aspects-of-a-humanitarian-crisis/#more-1416.
[24] Ibid.
[25] The presentation of the joint operations is based on information found at http://www.frontex. europa. eu/ structure/opertaions and http://www.frontex.europa.eu/ examples_of_accomplished_ operati.
[26] Frontex, “Update to Joint Operation Poseidon 2011,” March 26, 2011, http://www.frontex. europa. eu/newsroom/news_releases/art104.html.
[27] Frontex, “Hermes 2011 Starts Tomorrow in Lampedusa,” February 19, 2011, http://www.fron tex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art95.html.
[28] Council Regulation No 863/2007 of July 11, 2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) Np 1007/1004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers [2007] L199/30.
[29] Frontex, “External Relations. Background,” http://www.frontex.europa.eu/external_relations/.
[30] European Commission, “Report on the Evaluation and Future Development of the Frontex Agency,” Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, February 30, 2006, COM(2008) 67 final.
[31] European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 Establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the Exteranal Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex),” Brussels, February 24, 2010, COM(2010) 61 final.
[32] Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on 29 Measures for Reinfocring the Protection of the External Borders and Combating Illegal Immigration,” Brussels, February, 25 and 26 2010.
[33] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Migration, Brussels, May 4, 2011, COM(2011) 248 final and Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a Dialogue for migraiton, mobility and security with the Southern Mediterranean countries, Brussels, May 24, 2011, COM(2011) 292 final.
[34] COWI, “External evaluation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union,” Final Report, January 15, 2009, p. 6.
[35] The proposal is not new. It was put forward by Kostas Karamanlis, the then Prime minister of Greece, in October 2004.

author： Kostas Ifantis and Maria Gianniou