Strategic and Regional Setting of the Asia-Pacific in the Next Five Years:Driving Forces and Prospects
2013/09/09
abstract
I. Three Defining Features of the Current Round of Rebuilding Regional Order
The Asia-Pacific order has come to a critical juncture of the third round of rebuilding since the World War II. In contrast with the previous two rounds of regional order formed respectively in the Cold War era and during the 1990s in the wake of the Cold War, the current round of rebuilding of regional order has been accompanied with a couple of impressive characteristics.
First, the geo-political and geo-economic dimensions of the Asia-Pacific are expanding unprecedentedly.
With the deepening economic globalization, regional connectivity and interdependence, as well as the widening and interwoven impacts of traditional and non-traditional security threats distributed at an intense pace over internet and across borders, the concept of “Asia-Pacific” has transcended its conventional reference to East Asia and western Pacific to encompass the entire Asian continent (including Russia’s far east, the Central and South Asia) and the south Pacific area. The concept of a “Greater Asia-Pacific” is taking shape—a region covers the Pacific and Indian Ocean, of nearly 4 billion population, over $42 trillion in total economic output (60% of the world’s total), and over $20 trillion in trade volume (77% of the world’s total), with an increasingly deep and complex interaction between and among political, economic, security and environmental factors.
Second, Asian countries are increasingly playing a central role in the regional order rebuilding despite the engagement by a growing number of players in Asia-Pacific.
The Asia-Pacific major powers, such as China, the U.S., Japan, and regional powers such as the North Korea (DPRK), South Korea, Australia, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations, continue to play their important part in the transition and restructuring of the Asia-Pacific order. Russia, India, Mongolia, the Central Asian and the south Pacific countries—traditionally the region’s “distant relatives”—lose no opportunity to engage in the reshuffling process. Moreover, extra-regional powers, including Europe, Latin America, and even a number of major African countries also start pivoting to the Asia-Pacific.
Several important Asian factors are contributing to the centrality of Asian countries in this dynamic setting. Among them, the robust economic growth of Asia amidst the 2008 global financial meltdown and consequently the world economic recession has rendered Asia as the most important economic engine nowadays. Today Asia is approaching 30% of global gross domestic product (GDP) and contributing to more than 50% the global economic growth. In addition, by demonstrating resilience against weaker external demand recently and nascent domestic demand, Asia’s intra-regional trade has reached up to 52%, higher than those in North America and in Europe. Asia’s economic prowess will help consistently upgrade its comprehensive influence on the re-building of Asia-Pacific order.
China factor is another most important indigenous driving force of rebuilding regional order. It is fair to say that in the past few years most stakeholders in this region have readjusted their policy to respond to China’s unprecedented development. China rise’ repercussion around the region will continue in the foreseeable future.
Regional players have nowadays gained more independence and confidence than before in their interaction vis-à-vis the United States though to various degrees. While the Obama administration has reiterated to pivot/rebalance to Asia on its top agenda in his second term, and its Asia policy will continue to influence regional players’ policy in multifaceted way, the United States is incapable of dominating the regional order as it used to. Given the emerging indigenous dynamism within the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. influence of shaping the emerging regional order is determined by whether Washington can fully understand the common vision of the Asia-Pacific and thus is capable of boosting common interest and common development through win-win cooperation. The traditional paradigm of just passively following America’s regional policy by Asian countries can hardly be applicable today. Most of the regional players, big or small, are intensifying their strategic planning respectively, trying their best to seize the strategic initiative and upper hand in the restructuring of the Asia-Pacific order.
Third, the region’s development and security confront a complicated situation where opportunities and challenges are intertwined and mutually transforming.
On one hand, to counteract the deepening consequences of the 2008 financial crisis and the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis, the Asia-Pacific continues to function as a global engine for growth by enhancing economic cooperation and interdependence. On other hand, the “maritime disputes” grow in the security agenda, including island/reefs disputes, territorial sea demarcation, and competitions and frictions over the exploration of relevant sea resources becoming prominent. Traditional and non-traditional security threats and challenges are interwoven and mutually transforming, making the security situation in this region even more complicated.
II. Driving Forces and Their Implications on Intra-regional Interactions
In the foreseeable future, developments of the following four pairs of relations will deeply affect the directions and nature of the future intra-regional interactions in the Asia-Pacific.
The first pair is the complex relations of dual structures in the Asia-Pacific, namely the interplay between regional economic structure and regional political/security structure.
This pair of relation can either go in the direction of positive interaction, or continue to maintain its dichotomy, operating largely independent of each other’s influences, or even retreat to a negative interaction where, for example, zero-sum competitions in the security arena become so prominent that it will hold back the momentum for cooperation in economic and trade areas.
The second pair is the relation between security demand and supply within the Asia-Pacific.
Confronting a situation where traditional and non-traditional security threats and challenges intertwine and transform mutually, it remains to be seen whether the Asia-Pacific has (1) enough security mechanisms---as public goods provider---to handle security challenges of all sorts, and (2) whether, in response to the security demands, the existing security mechanisms’ flexibility and effectiveness are adequate to prevent and manage varieties of security challenges and crises, and (3) whether the existing and emerging regional security mechanisms are inclusive enough so that all those key stakeholders and players would be involved for the regional common security.
The third pair is the strategic relations among regional major powers.
Given the increasing complex relations among regional major powers where the elements of competition and cooperation are on rise at once, to what extent can Asia-Pacific’s major powers, through relentless efforts and under proper institutions and arrangements construction, build a sustainable strategic trust so that a more predictable strategic coordination and strategic stability could be achieved?
The fourth pair is the interaction between internal affairs and foreign policy.
Nationalism and populism nowadays are running high in most Asia-Pacific countries. Major countries are either in sensitive periods of political transition or in delicate phases of economic restructure, or in a critical juncture of social transformation, resulting in the even more profound intertwining between and among domestic issues, foreign affairs as well as national defense/military issues. Whether governments can manage and balance the interactions among internal affairs, foreign policy, and national defense/military, and mitigate the domestic affairs’ constraining effects on diplomatic agendas will be an important factor influencing the Asia-Pacific security configuration.
The above four pairs of relations are not without overlaps and do not play their part independent of each other’s influences. Instead, they are intricately interwoven and interact as causes and effects, collectively contributing to the prospect of intraregional interaction in the Asia-Pacific region.
III. Three Scenarios of Intra-regional Interaction in the Asia-Pacific
Starting from the above analysis of the four pairs of composite relations, the Asia-Pacific is likely to witness three scenarios of intra-regional interaction based upon the nature and level of regional cooperation.
The first prospect is a competition-cooperation interaction, which is largely the status quo of the Asia-Pacific interaction.
To begin with, the economic - political/ security relation in the Asia-Pacific is of a dual structure, separate from each other. On one hand, institutionalized cooperation and interdependence in the economic area continue to develop, showing a positive trend of healthy competition, in spite of the fierce competition for supremacy between and among the major economies in this region. On the other hand, there are traditional geo-strategic competitions in the security area, but these competitions are manageable. Overall, the economic cooperation and interdependence has not yet translated into regional political/security cooperation, yet the competitions and some tensions in the political/security areas do not hold back the momentum for economic cooperation. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) launched at the ASEAN Summit held between November 18-21, 2012 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and the negotiations on free trade agreement initiated by China, Japan, and South Korea have shown that with the still functional “fire wall”, there has been no “cross infection” in the dual structure of the economic and political/security relation. Secondly, though regional security mechanisms have been improved, they are still separate rather than synthesized. In particular, the regional military alliance dominated by the U.S. and its exclusiveness have been the main source of distrust between China and U.S. And potential of some mechanisms intended to address regional hot issues is undermined due to the conflicting interests and lack of mutual trust among stakeholders. In general, regional security mechanisms are more effective in non-traditional security areas than in traditional security areas, showing that existing security mechanisms fall short of the demand for alleviating and settling traditional security issues. Thirdly, overall major power relations in the Asia-Pacific are on the track of competition-cooperation, but the strategic suspicions between China and the U.S., and between China and Japan show no sign of alleviation. On the contrary, these suspicions deepen as the US strengthened the U.S.-led military alliance as a way to implement its rebalancing policy in the Asia-Pacific and took side with Japan and some ASEAN countries to criticize China over maritime disputes. Finally, against the backdrop that major countries in the region are right in a sensitive and delicate period of economic transition, political restructuring, and social transformation, governments of these countries are making efforts to strike a delicate balance among domestic issues, foreign policy, and national defense. However, internal affairs’ spill-over on foreign policy has been growing and nationalism/populism constrains diplomatic maneuverability to even a greater extent.
The second prospect is the cooperation-based interaction.
To begin with, the economic factor and the political/security factor in the dual structure interact in a positive way. The intra-Asia-Pacific economic and trade interdependence and interconnection deepen. While the level of institutionalized sub-regional cooperation is improved, the various sub-regional mechanisms for economic and trade cooperation will also promote and align with each other in a step-by-step advancement. The deepening economic cooperation will not only be the ballast for maintaining cooperation in the entire Asia-Pacific region, but also drive the dual economic-political/security structure in the direction of integration. Secondly, management and crisis-control mechanisms to address intra-Asia-Pacific hot issues, traditional and non-traditional security issues, and security trust mechanisms work properly; regional security mechanisms, while developing towards common and cooperative security mechanisms, enhance their inclusiveness, and new security concepts such as common security and cooperative security constitute the mainstream and widely shared by the regional players. Thirdly, strategic trust among major powers advances. High level coordination mechanisms are set up by regional players which share common or similar visions about the general objective and basic principles about the Asia-Pacific order. Finally, governments in the region are highly capable of steering their strategic planning by striking a good balance among domestic issues, foreign policy agendas and national defense. Rational rather irrational nationalism becomes the mainstream in international relations.
The third prospect is the confrontation-based interaction.
In this scenario, not only the dual structure of economy and politics/security separate, but also it deteriorates into a vicious interaction in which, as far as security issues are concerned, the competitions for supremacy or claims to specific rights and interests intensifies in such a bad way as to undermine the intra-regional economic exchange and even lead to blatant “economic warfare”. Secondly, exclusiveness rather than inclusiveness in different security mechanisms is enhanced and various military coalition/groups are formed among major countries against each other. As a result, the capability of handling regional hot issues and managing crises is weakened, and the regional powers’ willingness and determination to provide more public goods for governance of public domains is undermined. Thirdly, the security dilemma between major powers is aggravated. To make matter worse, the previously strategic hedging has deteriorated into explicit strategic deterrence and confrontation, further weakening the foundation for strategic stability among major powers. Fourthly, governments’ capability of maintaining a delicate and good balance among domestic issues, foreign affairs, and national defense is weakened, and nationalism especially irrational nationalism runs higher, leaving little leeway for diplomacy and compromises.
In view of all things at present, the competition-cooperation paradigm is most likely to be the basic feature of the intra-regional interaction in the Asia-Pacific in the short and medium-term. However, in light of the dynamic interaction of above four pairs of relations, special attention must be focused on consolidating the physical, conceptional as well as institutional building for cooperative interactions in the Asia-Pacific. And at the same time, regional players should give high priority to capacity building in crisis-and risk management and control so as to prevent the situation from worsening into confrontation-based interaction. In sum, at this important juncture for the Asia-Pacific region, patience, wisdom, a higher level of philosophical thinking, and a grander historical view are in demand. And the new security concept of “equality, mutual trust, inclusiveness, mutual learning and win-win cooperation” should be vigorously promoted and widely practiced.
