New Trends of American Liberal Internationalism: Summary and Evaluation

2013/05/24

abstract

Changes in the international situation call for strategic adjustments of China and the Unites States as well. Recent years, troubled by the weak domestic economy, dangerous debt, high unemployment and social polarization, declining international reputation, questioned world overlord status, and so on, a new wave of U.S. recession controversy appears.[①] Reality causes Americans with crisis sense to start thinking about adjusting the U.S. global strategy to adapt to the changing world. Since the late period of the Bush administration, especially the 2008 economic crisis, a number of liberal scholars, represented by John Ikenberry and Joseph Nye, proposed to reshape the global order and enhance the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony, in order to maintain the idea of U.S. “the world leader” status. These scholars have a strong influence in American academic and political circle and some also involve in decision-making of foreign affairs, moreover, coupled with the demonstration of the think tank and media publicity, the influence of this ideological trend cannot be ignored in American society, especially in political circles. Among domestic scholars, there has been some research achievements based on certain key texts and perspectives,[②] and because this ideological trend is still developing and changing, expressions are fragmented and content are too complex and involve political and ideological analysis. This paper tracks its latest developments and combines with the reality to carry out an in-depth analysis for resolution of such issues as, where such ideological trend come from, what are the core content, and how to understand these new developments. I. From Neo-Conservatism to Liberal Internationalism
In international affairs, hegemony needs not only strong material force as a basis, but also more good international image and identification of other countries for their own power and position, and “benign hegemony” has some legitimacy.[③] Hegemonic legitimacy is also the important variable to affect selection of other countries for hegemony behaviors.[④] Its nature requires that a powerful country should maintain strategic act restraints, not abuse its power and provide international community with a public service.
The United States with super strength will naturally face the problem of hegemonic legitimacy.[⑤] In 1999, The Economist has a special article, which says that as for other countries, the United States is like a giant looking down on the globe, but “having so much power, it does not know how to behave”. This paper hopes that the United States can become “a wise superpower”, and also predicts and knows that “If America refuses multilateral entanglements, it may be blissfully free; but it will also be alone. It will be a leader with no one to lead, in a world made unstable by its very isolation.”[⑥] The fact in a few years ago of the 21st century tells us, the forecast of Economist has come true. Of course, the United States has become “an arrogant superpower”, rather than “a wise superpower”, which is not an accident of history, but the product of post-Cold War international system and domestic factors. Only by taking the foreign guiding ideology for example can illustrate that it is not surprising that the prediction of The Economist has come true. On the occasion of the end of the Cold War, the U.S. neo-conservatism begins to rise, and playing traditional factors, such as American superiority, the moral conquest and strength supremacy, to the limit is the salient feature.[⑦] Such as the general of neo-conservatism, Charles Krauthammer, at the nearly end of the Cold War, cannot wait to announce that “the most significant feature in post-Cold War era of the world is unipolarity,” and “the United States, which has a number of Western allies to follow in the world, will become a unchallengeable superpower.”[⑧] In 2004 Enterprise Institute’s annual dinner speech, he has a comprehensive critique for isolationism, liberal internationalism and realism and throws “democratic realism”, and he thinks that the expansion of democracy and American values is the necessary means to ensure that the interests of the United States and carry out intervention and reconstruction of the country at valuable places. Faced with criticism of this idea for its ignorance of legitimacy, he further points out that the action should be concerned about the results and not be bound by “international legitimacy”.[⑨] It is thus clear that, palpable and triumphant joy and arrogance are shown in facial expressions and “prudent” and “restraint” virtue as well as “excessive expansion” warning are long been forgotten. The 9/11 terrorist attacks provide the chance for them to output to the world the ideologies and to establish “ the Pax Americana”, and George W. Bush was twice elected as the president, which makes the new conservative influence up to the peak,[⑩] but the duration of the war on terror, unilateralist foreign policy, forcibly exporting democracy and other factors seriously erode American power and also cause the rising of world anti-Americanism, including dissatisfaction with Western partners,[11] and the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony faces challenges.[12] At the same time that some scholars begin to question why the United States would incur such an unhappy case, the pressure caused by changes in the world situation also follows, especially since 2008, the rapid development of the non-Western world comes out, but many Western countries, including the United States, fall into the quagmire of economic crisis and debt. In this case, some liberal scholars who have somewhat subsided since the Reagan administration begin to perk up and think about the fate of U.S. hegemony and the liberal international order.
In fact, starting from the 9/11 attacks, from “soft power” and “smart power” to the old and new variety of “prescriptions” inclusive of “offshore balancing” appeared to scholars with different theoretical preferences. In many perspectives with larger influence, some of the points are of similarity, such as Hillary Clinton's saying, “being a 21st-century power means accepting a share of the burden of solving common problems, and abiding by the rules of the road on everything from intellectual-property rights to fundamental freedoms”;[13] the liberal internationalism standard-bearer, John Ikenberry, insists that “updating liberal international order” can continue to provide wealth and security, while the core of the liberal international order is the US-led international mechanisms and international norms; Joseph Nye carries out publicity for the “soft power” and “smart power”; Robert Keohane continuously issues articles to set up the evaluation criteria for the legitimacy of global governance mechanism. It is thus clear that elites from U.S. political circles and educational circles begin to reflect on and explore how to stabilize international order led by the United States and shape U.S. hegemony legitimacy. In fact, a decade ago, the famous scholar Immanuel Wallerstein pointed out that the collapse of the Soviet Union actually deprived the only ideological legitimacy of American hegemony”, and “arrogance self-naturally would have negative consequences” and “even if with a lack of cooperation from other countries on the actions of the United States, it will also endanger the interests of the United States.”[14] Brzezinski and Kissinger also believe that the current existed and questioned U.S. ability to guide the global institutional changes, mainly lies in the lack of U.S. international legitimacy, rather than the power, and “other states may simply refuse to follow a leader whose legitimacy has been squandered.”[15] In this case, in the face of internal and external problems as well as the international legitimacy plight, how do American liberal scholars think about the problem and a way out?
II. Theoretical and Practical Starting Points
Changes in the world situation provide liberal scholars with the stage for fully performing and liberals from educational circles, think tanks and political circles have mobilized, forming a series of research projects, such as“ Truman National Security Project”, “Princeton Project on National Security”, “CSIS Commission on Smart Power”, “Centre for a New American Security” and “Managing Global Insecurity”, wherein, Forging a world of liberty under law：U.S. national security in the 21st century issued by “Princeton Project on National Security” in 2006, Strategic Leadership: Framework for a 21st Century National Security Strategy issued by CNAS in 2008 and America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration in 2012 cause extensive concerns and comment. These projects drive Anne-Marie Slaughter, G. John Ikenberry, Francis Fukuyama, Joseph S. Nye, Bruce Jones and Rachel Kleinfeld to extensively participate in them. Their points and views have their own bias, for further analysis, this paper combines with the key figures inclusive of Ikenberry and the latest research reports. First, sum up logical starting points of their argument and understanding of the real issues.
A. Power needs rules, and order requires “liberal hegemony”
An understanding of power and order of argument logical starting point concretely can be summarized into two points: one is the operation of power needs legitimacy and rules, the other is U.S. hegemony and the liberal international order interact to promote each other. In dealing with the powers, liberalism has the traditional thought to limit the power, unrestricted power is inevitably the abuse of power and the healthy functioning of the power must be rule-based. A basic view of Ikenberry is, “the power run in a system of rules is more of durability and legitimacy; rules formed under the principle of consent rules are more of vitality and legitimacy and are the support of reasonable power structure.” and “in building liberal international order, authority and rules are indispensable.”[16] In terms of the order, “the liberal international order” are always the concept that liberals uphold and they think that the post-war world political and economic order has the openness and institutional characteristics, moreover, it is an “embedded liberalism” order under the auspices of an American advantage strength,[17] the core concept (the market economy, liberalization and political democratization) spreads to other countries through “mandatory, competition, active learning and imitation” and other mechanisms.[18] The relatively representative point of view is “structure liberalism”, which thinks that a few salient features under postwar American liberal hegemony ensure the stability of the world order: “Security Co-Binding” (in fact refer to US-led alliance system) eases the pressure of international conflicts; “Penetrated hegemony” (the Western powers can influence each other through various channels) enhances U.S. hegemony legitimacy by giving other countries the opportunities to participate in and the sharing of decision-making; “Semi-sovereignty and partial great powers” (limits for Germany and Japan) constraints potentially belligerent countries; “Economic Openness” (openness between the Western developed economies) obtains the relative gains while promoting interdependence; “Civic Identity” (American-style liberalism diffusion) mitigates conflict and promotes fusion between Western countries, thus, the liberal order makes “the Western order taking the United States as the center is more of legitimacy than the level and subordinate order. [19]
Indeed, such a liberal international order is not spontaneously formed, but produced by U.S. management. Ikenberry thinks that after the end of the world war that changes the international system, the victorious dominant big country faces a chaotic international order and returns to the domestic country, makes the international system to restore the balance of power, punishes the defeated nation, establishes the hegemonic order by virtue of the strength and the three strategic choices of constitutional order with the core of system and rules. The United States, after “World War I” finally selects “isolationism”, but it selected to establish constitutional order “cosmopolitanism” in 1945[20] and to establish the post-war international order with United Nations and the Bretton Woods system as the core. It can be said that “the success of the United States in World War II and during the Cold War, is closely related to the establishment and the expansion of the international institutional system, at the same time that these international system restrict the United States, they also make the position of power in the United States have legitimacy.”[21] Generally, in order to realize the stable international political relationship, operation of the power needs to rely on the rules and the maintenance of order needs to have a leader pursuing a “liberal hegemony”. In their view, this leader is the United States.
B. Understanding the problems facing the United States
On nearly consistent stance, the liberal (moderates) make analysis of the issues the U.S. hegemony and international legitimacy confront, from the criticism of neo-conservatism, and they also recognize the pressure of changes in the international system and the shortcomings of the core mechanism of the established order.
First, liberal scholars think that after the Cold War, especially 9/11 terrorist attacks, with the neo-conservatives getting the upper hand, some of the basic principles of the liberal international order is damaged, the hegemony of neo-conservatism of the Bush administration, armed intervention and defiance of the international rules directly threaten the tradition of liberal internationalism.[22] Ikenberry writes with irony, George W. Bush administration includes the rhetoric of liberalism into the planning of the security and world order, as a result, these “liberal statements” are used to undermine postwar liberal international order.[23] Joseph Nye thought that the United States in George W. Bush administration was widely criticized for, the policy rather than culture and values, and the policy had weakened the ability to attract other countries foreign policy legitimacy and deepened the negative impression of the United States in the world.[24] Francis Fukuyama thinks that neo-conservatism is a combination of “excessive realism” and “excessive idealism”, this kind of thinking and behavior undermine the international legitimacy, which is important to the United States, thus it will inevitably bring resistance, complaint and opposition.[25] In short, liberal scholars believe that the Bush administration’s foreign policy has damaged the international image of the United States, undermined the liberal international order, and then damaged the international legitimacy of U.S. hegemony.
Second, it comes from the international level. After the Cold War, there are changes in the international environment, the emerging economies represented by BRICS enjoy the rapid development, while the traditional economic powers represented by the United States are relatively in recession, moreover, the problems brought by the Washington consensus and the emergence of a new model of development, etc. make “liberal international order” face the most serious challenge since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar struggle system , and this “liberal international order” is established in the early postwar period and developed in the Cold War period. The United States establishes and leads “Liberal Internationalism 2.0” type international order and its main problems can be divided into two aspects. One is the end of the Cold War diminishes the motives of the United States to be responsible for the international obligations and the provision of international public goods, the other one is the international system lacks checks and balances for American hegemony, so that the U.S. “empire impulse” exacerbates, the principle of sovereignty has also been progressively undermined and the generalization of international system facing terrorism and other violence occurs, “In a fundamental sense there is an authority crisis in today’s liberal order”,[26] many countries no longer consider this order beneficial to their own security and development.
Finally, under the combined influence of the mentioned aspects, the legitimacy of global governance mechanism, as the core of the “liberal international order”, has also been questioned. The current international system’s international security and economic system are all dominated by the Western developed countries, the reaction of the interests of the major powers would not allow them to effectively provide international public goods,[27] With the growing number of global issues and the rapid development of some non-Western countries, such issues as the lack of ability to solve the problem of the development of international system, especially the democratic decision-making and representation issues, are all proposed by the emerging countries.[28] Pascal Lamy, the WTO Director-General, also considers the legitimacy and leadership, coherence and efficiency as the major challenges that global governance mechanism faces.[29] The main global governance mechanism (or international system) is the important basis of “liberal international order” and the good operation of the international mechanisms is also one of the main performances, the problems faced by major international regime is actually the issues faced by the order.
III. Policy Prescriptions for Problems America Faces
In the case of the above-mentioned basic stance and understanding of the main issues, how do liberal scholars think a way out of it? By major scholarly analysis, this article will summarize it into three points: establish the confidence of U.S. hegemony and the “liberal international order”; launch transformation of the established order to make it accord with realistic needs, create new rules and mechanisms to make up the lack of existent mechanisms; the United States, as the leader of the “liberal international order”, should adjust its strategy to be more flexible.
First, break the doubts and establish the confidence of U.S. hegemony and “the liberal international order”. Although since 2001, especially since 2008, the U.S. hegemony and its dominated international order suffer a wide range of questions and challenges, after the liberal scholars understand the questions, that are full of confidence in the American hegemony and the existent international order, and before looking further the resolved program, they point out the reasons why they should be confident. Joseph Nye is of the representativeness. He believes that “America's decline” is largely psychological, rather than the real power resources, “the United States is only relatively declining rather than absolutely declining, there is a reason to believe that the United States in the coming decades is still able to maintain its dominant position of power,”[30] then it further means that US-led international order just faces less serious problems, and it simply needs adjustment rather than reform. Ikenberry, departing from the liberal international order, tells those who have doubts about the future to be optimistic about the order. He believes that due to the fact that “liberal international order is already highly developed, involves a wide range, mutual coordination and institutionalization, moreover, it has taken root in the economy and society of the developed capitalist countries and developing countries”, and development of emerging countries from the established order is inextricably linked to its interests relations, the emerging powers has not proposed the alternatives for the established order, “the alternative selection with the same functions and legitimacy as the existing order has not come out”.[31] Therefore, “liberal international order” is a sustained irreplaceable choice.
Second, reform the established order, make it accord with realistic needs, create new rules and mechanisms to make up for the deficiencies of the existing ones and summarize them into “restructuring” and “establishment”, which are two mutually reinforcing aspects, so that the “liberal international order” can adapt to the new changes. “Restructuring” is mainly targeted to be the existing international system, and its critical part is to establish new mechanisms, rules and standards for the restructuring and establishment, in order to adapt to the needs of reality, moreover, it is believed that the world today lacks an effective system of granting legitimacy to the collective action of the international community, establishment of the new organization that satisfies the double needs of legitimacy and efficiency is an important task in the future.”[32] For example, in terms of mechanism, the emergence of the G20 meets the need for platform needed to solve practical problems in the context of the global financial crisis, makes up for the issue that the existent mechanism representation is not wide and eases the relationship between the major powers and emerging countries, moreover, it “promotes the stability of the global order.”[33] Although the actual role of the G20 mechanism has a lot of questions, it also cannot be denied its role of the stability of the international order in a timely manner. As for the existent mechanisms, the three major international economic organizations of the important pillars of the liberal international order should particularly be strengthened in the topic extension, representation and authorization, so as to restore the vitality. The function of the World Bank is weakened in the traditional international development, but it can play a new role in the sustainable development and climate change issues.[34] In terms of the evaluation of the established mechanism, the basic tenets of liberal internationalism are considered as legal standards. Wherein, Keohane, in the evaluation of the legitimacy of global governance mechanism, proposes his own standard, that is, the consensus of democratic countries is the necessary condition to evaluate the legitimacy of global governance mechanisms; moreover, it should do its best to promote democracy. In Keohane discussion, the specific criteria refers to design levels, such as “mechanism inclusion”, “information quality” and “responsibility”, and it does not touch on the deep-seated factors, such as mechanism representativeness, fairness and distribution of power,[35] and obviously on stance of maintenance of existing mechanisms and the current order. In the level of “organizational system”, it mainly is the basis of updating or creation of liberal international order, and it specifically can be divided into three levels of politics, economy and security. Political level is mainly “Concert of Democracies”, economic level is to enhance interdependence, and security level is to enhance common security mechanism. The liberals naturally have democratic plot, and thus when looking at the factors that affect international relations, democracy is a key variable bound to be considered. Neo-conservatism advocates do not hesitate to use coercive means to expand democracy, the liberals propose a joint between the existing democratic countries, that is, “democratic country agreement”, the formulation is from “The Princeton Report”, which proposes the main purpose of establishment of “Concert of Democracies” is to “strengthen security cooperation of free and democratic countries in the world”, “make the ‘democratic peace theory’ to be recognized and institutionalized”, and “as a an alternative forum of free and democratic countries when the United Nations can not reform”.[36] But it should avoid alienating other countries in politics, or even replacing the United Nations Security Council, avoid tensions between democratic countries and other countries and should not become a tool to legitimize the U.S. military action, but should be a club to promote global collective action and can constrain the power of the United States.[37] In economy, the proposed recommendations increase the interdependence of the world economy. Among liberals, there has been a view that upholds economic interdependence, especially trade relations, can increase the common interests and needs of international mechanisms, so as to promote the realization of cooperation. In conditions of the interests of mutual penetration, multilateral economic mechanisms can be extended, with a spillover from the economic field to other issue fields, in fact, as the core of the international economic order, the Bretton Woods system is dominated by Western powers for a long time and also considered as an important guarantee for world stability and development by free internationalists. In the case of the rise of non-Western countries, scholars that only protect the “liberal international order” would naturally rise to bundle more countries in a “free” and “open” world economic system. In terms of security, some propose more interesting new ideas that insist to enhance “security interdependence”, similar to the logic of “economic interdependence”, “in security interdependent environment, a country alone would not be able to guarantee its own security, but it should carry out negotiations and cooperation with other countries and seek mutual restraint and mutual protection”, additionally, the concept nature is collective security, which is also the truth of the initiative proposed by Woodrow Wilson after World War I.
Finally, in their view, the key to solve the U.S. hegemony legitimacy and “liberal international order” problem is the United States, “the core characteristic of the American-led international order is liberalism, and in terms of American interests and the stability of the global governance, “the United States needs to endeavor to reestablish its hegemonic legitimacy—a preeminent objective that must be pursued with policies and doctrine that signal America’s commitment to rule-based order.”[38] After Obama announced his candidacy for president in 2007, he also made it clear that “we can and should lead the world, but it must be more nimble and needs to be adjusted, the part of our leadership is connected to our self-restraint.”[39] There are a lot of reviews concerning this aspect, and this article will not repeat this. Ikenberry proposed in his new book Liberal Leviathan in 2011, the United States should return to the liberal internationalists’ traditional philosophy, and this is the relatively systematic recommendation of the U.S. global strategy, worthy of attention and thinking. Its main content has five rules, “the United States should take advantage of international rules to lead the world, not to dominate the world by virtue of it; it should provide for the international community public service, it should adapt to the needs of reality to create or reshape the international rules and the international system; it should keep a close relationship between democratic countries; it should not take ways that may damage the legitimacy to extend mandatory or promote the liberal international order.”[40] In the above-mentioned measures, international regime theory, democratic peace theory, the interdependence theory, and other liberal theories on international relations run through it and it also proposes relatively comprehensive recommendations to maintain and improve the “liberal international order”. When the scholars propose policy envisages, they also express their hope to envision. At the end of the Liberal Leviathan, there is a prophecy, “It has lost some of that authority and respect in recent years. In committing itself to a grand strategy of liberal order building, it can begin the process of gaining it back.”[41]
IV. Nature of Recent Development
A simple summary of new trends of liberal thinking is made; there is a need to make an analysis of the two problems, in order to get more in-depth understanding. First, although liberals are consistent in the basis of criticism of the neo-conservatism, the internal different scholars have different tendencies and different understandings on some issues and the external part also faces different voices. Second, although there are various ideological differences, they aim to maintain U.S. hegemony; its essence is a manifestation of ideological hegemony, with strong American centrism bias.
Ideological tendencies and backgrounds of the participating scholars are complex. Some are traditional liberals (e.g. Ikenberry and Keohane) and some originally belonged to the neo-conservatives and then criticized the neo-conservatives (such as Fukuyama). Moreover, they share a common feature, that is, the critique of neo-conservatism. In liberals, Ikenberry’s contribution and impact are the biggest, in academic aspect, he has been concerned about “the liberal international order”, as for its origin, the basis and the principle, maintaining and change, facing problems and development direction, there is in-depth exposition, and in numerous public discourses, After Victory and Liberal Leviathan have an overall feasibility study on the relationship between the United States and the liberal international order, Foreign Affairs and other well-known publications issue a series of comments and responses of this publication, with a significant influence. An American scholar has such comments on Ikenberry as, “the United States, in the past half-century, had constructed and developed liberal international order and play a leading role. Currently, it successfully shifts the focus of U.S. grand strategy to be concentrated to repairing and extending the order.[42] Apart from Liberals, scholars have different opinions of American hegemony and the global order. In 2009, like the former U.S. Presidents, Obama chanted the “change” slogan into the White House. Ikenberry gave Obama the recognized evaluation in 2001, and he believes that “As the president, Obama has brought U.S. foreign policy back to the mainstream of the World War II: emphasis on alliances, partnerships, multilateralism, homemade powers and democratic community.” But there are many scholars who hold different views. At the beginning of the Obama administration, there is an analysis that believes that “the neoconservatives will not leave easily”, and will continue to affect the government's foreign policy.[43] In the early 2012, the United States Foreign Policy magazine does a survey on the current strategic situation in the United States among the leading U.S. international studies’ scholars. The results were clearly divided. The liberal scholars, think that the biggest problem is that China's rise has brought changes in the international order pressure, while realist scholars (Kenneth Waltz and Mearsheimer) think the biggest problem comes from the U.S. “imperial overstretch”, and do not think that U.S. hegemony has been challenged.[44] Even the “liberal internationalism” itself also has differences. One group thinks that the domestic and international environment for liberal internationalism has changed, its expansive tendencies were not suited to the internal and external demands in the United States and the United States should pay more attention to its domestic problems; the other group thinks that liberal internationalism is in line with the interests of the United States, and should be used as the basis for the United States to solve the world’s problems and to deal with the challenges. [45]
Whether the internal liberals or scholars that hold criticism attitude towards liberal internationalism, their basic goal is the same - to maintain U.S. dominance by adjusting the U.S. global strategy. In 2010, Hillary Clinton, at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, clearly expressed to many American elites that “in this new century, the United States can, must and will play a leading role”, “the world will continue to count on and rely on us”[46], the starting point for the U.S. global strategic thinking is how to maintain the dominance of the “world leader”. In this big objective, the liberals just lay more emphasis on shaping the soft aspects of American hegemony in international legitimacy, identity and international mechanisms. Rousseau has a saying, which is often quoted, “even the strongest one will not be strong enough to always be the master, unless he converts his own brute force into powerful rights, and obedience into duty.”[47] The liberals that follow Wilson traditions are naturally very familiar with it. It will convert brute force into the relationship between rights and obligations, and become the accepted and recognized leader, with a high degree of legitimacy, that is, shaping American hegemony legitimacy by international norms and mechanisms. The British scholar, Scott Strange, thinks that there are security, production, finance and knowledge interrelated and affected structure of power in international relations.[48] The United States has not only tangible advantages in production, financial and physical security, but also intangible advantages in knowledge and discourse, and Joseph Nye has explicitly said, “In the information age, success not only refers to the military victory, but also refers to whose story is more attractive.”[49] Advocacy to “liberal international order” itself is with a strong U.S. centrism color, and in fact it is the use of the U.S. academic advantages that create the campaign for the U.S. Hegemony.
However, the legitimacy is related to identity, its evaluation criteria depends on the lines rather than the words, and it also lies in achieving mutual benefit and win-win situation with other countries and providing necessary public service for the international community. In theory, the liberals also will provide international public service as an important means of shaping the international legitimacy, and Joseph Nye thinks that the United States should provide international public goods, including: “promote an open international economy, preserve international commons, maintain international rules and institutions, assist economic development and act as convener of coalitions and mediator of disputes.”[50] However, the fact is that maintenance of the balance of powers in the region is to curb the development of the regional powers, as the main conflict mediator, it was biased in favor of Israel and intervention in his country’s internal conflict in the Middle East. Even if the United States truly provides international public goods, which will be the “membership”, which other countries cannot freely just join and get access to. However, from the liberals’ formulations, stability and development of the post-war world are the credit of the United States, “free-riding” of other countries benefiting from the public service provided by the United States. As for this, Kenneth Waltz has hit the nail by saying “Just as the United States did, powerful countries always tend to think of their own actions is for the world peace, justice and well-being, but these wonderful words are defined according to power preferences, and often do not meet the preferences and interests of other countries.”[51]
With this sense of superiority, when liberal internationalists make an analysis of the problems, the problems in U.S. foreign relations in the past few years are headlong pushed to the hubris of the neo-conservatives and there must be deeper U.S. domestic political economic and social causes for the popularity of neo-conservatives, but the liberal scholars have not had serious reflections, but to be granted with “necessary ignorance”. As for proposals to solve the problem, the United States is considered as the core, as a “lonely hero” to solve the world's problems. However, the reality is that the United States is the root of many problems. The world is the world of all countries and not the only world of the United States, and reshaping of the international political and economic order should take the interests of other countries into consideration and requires the joint participation of the major powers. On the analysis basis that does not involve deep-seated factors, the ideas put forward only may be the “refurbishment” instead of “innovation” of the concept of liberalism. In the above comments, it is clear that, in fact, liberals, including other scholars, are with a utilitarian perspective on the hegemony of the United States to look at the international obligations of the United States, the so-called adjustment of liberal internationalism just changes the strategy.
V. Conclusion
There are hidden interest demands behind a discourse and total reality supports behind ideological debate, and thinking of the national elites is like a mirror in particular, reflecting the deeper reality of a country’s problems. Various ideological thoughts come out successively on the U.S. global strategy stage and there are deeper reasons of domestic society and the international community of the United States behind the bustle and stir. Additionally, an in-depth analysis needs to be carried out for changes from the neo-conservatism in full flourish to the bustle of liberal internationalism. International situation is changing every day and the argumentation and debate of different scholars of the United States is ongoing, therefore, many writings for comprehensive assessment cannot be completed in an article. As for the current trends of “liberal internationalism”, there are a few comments in the country, the paper selects the main representatives, commences around this critical point of the hegemonic legitimacy and carries out approximate clue combing and analysis. And it just sums up part of the main ideas of the liberal ideology. As for impact assessment of the trends deep-seated reasons, comparison of other viewpoints and realistic policy of the United States in particular, they all need to be conducted in a comprehensive analysis and provide the necessary reference for us to understand and handle Sino-US relations.
[①] The most representative and up-to-date discussion literatures are Kupchan A, Charles, “Is American Primacy Really Diminishing?” National Journal, March 17, 2012, p.4; Ian Bremmer, “5 Myths about America's Decline,” Washington Post, May 5, 2012; Ezra Klein,“America in Decline? Not Likely,” The Washington Post, May 18, 2012; David S. Mason, The End of the American Century, London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008; Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009.
[②] Most Chinese research achievements are mainly based on the report of “Princeton Plan” or the panel report of Democratic Party or liberals’ Phoenix Initiative, see YU Gongde, YING Yong, “American Strategic New Trends From Princeton Plan,” Contemporary International Relations, No. 1, 2007, pp. 49-53; HAN Zhili, “New Liberal Internationalism and Strategic Thinking in the United States,” Study of International Politics, No. 4, 2007, pp. 104-116; HAN Qingna, “U.S. National Security Strategy and Democratic State Treaty - Based on The Interpretation of The Princeton Report,” Foreign Affairs Review, No. 1, 2008, pp. 74-80; NIU Xinchun, “Obama’s Diplomacy: A Neo-liberal Era,” Contemporary International Relations, No. 5, 2009, pp. 32-38. Chinese scholars call this ideological trend as “new liberal internationalism”.
[③] The two terms “legitimate” and “legitimacy” are the most important ones that occur in the point of views of liberal internationalism, and they are also the basic concept in political science, their usual translation of “validity” or “legitimacy”. However, there are differences between them, “legitimate” is just a program consensual problem (although there are also psychological acceptability problems, but this acceptability is recessive), “legitimacy” is the value recognition and acceptance on the legal basis. The detailed analysis of the “hegemonic legitimacy”, see ZHANG Ruizhuang, “U.S. Hegemony Legitimacy Crisis,” International Forum, Summer 2004, pp. 55-67. The term “international legitimacy” is important in the study of international relations, see Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; David P. Rapkin and Dan Braaten, “Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2009, pp. 113-149.
[④] A systematic study of hegemonic legitimacy functioning in balance of power, see LIU Feng, “Structural Pressure, Hegemonic Legitimacy and Balancing Behavior,” International Political Science, No. 3, 2009, pp. 1-35.
[⑤] M. Patrick Cottrell, “Hope or Hype? Legitimacy and US Leadership in a Global Age,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2011, pp. 337-358.
[⑥] “America’s world,” Economist, Vol. 353, No. 8142, October 23, 1999, pp. 15-16.
[⑦] American scholar, Justin Vaïsse, summarizes Neo-conservatism characteristics into five aspects, including internationalism, primacy, unilateralism, militarism and democracy, see Justin Vaïsse, “Why Neoconservatism Still Matters?” Policy Paper, Number 20, May 2010, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution.
[⑧] Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1990/91, p. 23.
[⑨] Charles Krauthammer, “Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World,” 2004 Irving Kristol Lecture AEI Annual Dinner, February 10, 2004; Charles Krauthammer, “In Defense of Democratic Realism,” National Interest, Issue 77, 2004, pp. 21-22.
[⑩] On neoconservatist historical impacts on U.S. foreign policy, see Maria Ryan, Neoconservatism and the New American Century, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
[11] Jeffrey S. Kopstein, “Anti-Americanism and the Transatlantic Relationship,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2009, pp. 367-376.
[12] The detailed discussion of the plight of the hegemonic legitimacy in the United States after the Cold War, see JIAN Junbo, The Power and Legitimacy: The Legitimacy of The Post-Cold War American International Predicament Studies, Fudan University international relations doctoral dissertation, 2006, pp. 146-163.
[13] Clinton Hillary, “Way to Lead,” Economist, World 2011, November 27, 2010, p. 52.
[14] Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Eagle Has Crash Landed,” Foreign Policy, Issue 131, 2002, pp. 60-68.
[15] Stephen Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Reshaping the World Order,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 49-63.
[16] G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011, pp. XIV-XV.
[17] John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1982, pp. 379-415.
[18] Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett, “Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism,” International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 4, 2006, p. 782.
[19] Daniel Deudney, G. John Ikenberry, “The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1999, pp. 179-196.
[20] G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 21-51.
[21] G. John Ikenberry, “Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, Issue 4, 2004, p. 630.
[22] Michael Lind, “For Liberal Internationalism,” The Nation, July 2, 2007, p. 21.
[23] G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal International Theory in the Wake of 9/11 and American Unipolarity,” Paper for seminar on “ IR Theory, Unipolarity and September 11th - Five Years On,” NUPI, Oslo, Norway, February 3-4, 2006.
[24] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Decline of America's Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, Issue 3, 2004, p16.
[25] Francis Fukuyama, “The Neoconservative Moment,” National Interest, Issue 76, Summer 2004, pp. 61-63.
[26] G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order,” Vol. 7, No. 1, 2009, pp. 78-80.
[27] Edward A. Fogarty, “Legitimacy Dilemmas in Global Governance,” International Studies Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2012, p. 168.
[28] Michael Zürn, Matthew Stephen, “The View of Old and New Powers on the Legitimacy of International Institutions,” Politics, Vol. 30, Issue Supplement s1, 2010, pp. 93-98.
[29] Pascal Lamy, “Local Governments, Global Governance,” WTO, March 8, 2012, http://www. wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl220_e.htm.
[30] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6, 2010, pp. 2-12.
[31] G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3, 2011, pp. 56-68; G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 1, 2008, pp. 31-33; G. John Ikenberry, “Ikenberry Replies,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6, 2011, pp. 175-176.
[32] Francis Fukuyama, “After Neoconservatism,” The New York Times, February 19, 2006.
[33] Bruce Jones, Making Multilateralism Work: How the G-20 Can Help the United Nations, Muscatine: The Stanley Foundation, April 2010, p. 10.
[34] Stephen J. Stedman, Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, “Managing Global Insecurity: A Plan for Action,” Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, September 2008, pp. 19-23.
[35] Allen Buchanan, Robert Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2006, p. 415; Robert O. Keohane, “Global Governance and Legitimacy,” Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 18, No.1, pp. 99-109.
[36] G. John Ikenberry, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Forging a World of Liberty Under Law, Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security, 2006, p. 7.
[37] G. John Ikenberry, “An Agenda for Liberal International Renewal,” in Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley eds., Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy, Washington, D. C.: Center for a New American Security, 2008, p. 56.
[38] G. John Ikenberry, “An Agenda for Liberal International Renewal,” pp. 45-48.
[39] Roger Cohen, “Obama’s American Idea,” The New York Times, December 10, 2007.
[40] Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, pp. 358-360.
[41] Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, p. 360.
[42] Peter Berkowitz, “Liberal Internationalism and Freedom,” Policy Review, Issue 167, 2011, p. 80.
[43] G. John Ikenberry, “The Right Grand Strategy,” The American Interest, Vol. 5, No. 3, January/February 2010, pp. 12-14; Patrick Krey, “Neoconservatism in the Obama Age,” The New American, January 19, 2009, pp. 22-24; Alexandra Homolar-Riechmann, “The Moral Purpose of US Power: Neoconservatism in the Age of Obama,” Vol. 15, No. 2, June 2009, pp. 179–196.
[44] “View from the top,” Foreign Policy, Issue 191, 2012.
[45] Charles A. Kupchan, Peter L. Trubowitz, “The Illusion of Liberal Internationalism’s Revival,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 108-109; Stephen Chaudoin, Helen V. Milner, Dustin H. Tingley, “The Center Still Holds: Liberal Internationalism Survives,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2010, pp. 93–94.
[46] Mark Landler, “Clinton Speech Offers Policy Overview,” The New York Times, September 8, 2010.
[47] Rousseau, The Social Contract, 3rd edition, Beijing: Commercial Press, 2003, p. 9.
[48] Benjamin J. Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 51.
[49] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Get Smart,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 4, 2009, pp. 160-163.
[50] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The American National Interest and Global Public Goods”, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, 2002, p. 243.
[51] Kenneth N. Waltz, “America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective,” Political Science and Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1991, p. 669.

author： ZHAO Longyue and GUAN Chuanjing