Jiemian YANG, Chairman of the SIIS Academic Council
Keynote speech at Welcoming Dinner of the G-20 Meeting
Co-sponsored by the Shanghai Institutes for international Studies, the Stanley Foundation, Munk School of Global Affairs of the University of Toronto
Shanghai, September 26, 2013
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is my great privilege and honor to share with you on my thoughts on the New Model of Major Power Relations and the Evolution of G20. I have five main points to present to you.
I. Right Understanding of the Concept of NMMPR.
First of all, let us see how the Chinese government defines the notion of Major Powers. The Chinese State Councilor Mr. Yang Jiechi published an article in mid-August entitled “Innovations in China's Diplomatic Theory and Practice Under New Conditions”. In Part Two of this article, he summarized five major achievements of the Chinese new leadership’s innovations in diplomatic theory and practice. The second achievement is under the sub-heading of “putting forth the vision of building a new model of major-country relations”. Actually, “Major Powers” include three categories: Traditional Powers, Emerging Powers and Regional Powers (Middle Powers), which almost equate the G-20 members.
Therefore, China wants to work with all the G-20 members on global governance starting from economic governance. China aims at sharing rights and responsibilities for the transformation of international systems in a fairer and more equal manner. However, China is still on its learning curve and still needs to think and act in a major power’s position.
However, there are still doubts across the Pacific over whether and how China-U.S. relations can evolve into a NMMPR. Along the skepticism’s spectrum, one argument by some American observers goes that by initiating the NMMPR between China and the U.S., Beijing attempts to push Washington to accommodate China’s interests on Beijing’s terms and Washington’s acceptance of this concept is a matter of de facto “unilateral concession” to China, so argues this school of thinking.
Another popular argument observes that the trajectory of bilateral relations will continuously be constrained under the “neither enemy nor friend” approach, given two countries huge differences over political system, culture and values while maintaining an exceedingly interdependent economic ties, inter-societal exchanges as well as huge amount of global challenges in common. The “competition” or “competitive coexistence” illuminates the thematic pattern of the China-U.S. relationship in the foreseeable future, so goes this school. Therefore, the key challenge for the bilateral relationship should focus on managing bilateral competition/disputes rather than making up a lofty but hollow concept such as the NMMPR so that the balance of competition and cooperation in this relationship could be maintained in the latter’s favor.
The most extreme but also fairly popular thinking is that the rapid emergence of any new power would disrupt the status quo when the rising power approaching parity with the established power is the most unstable and prone to conflict. Thus the relationship between China and the U.S. has been put into the framework of a rising power vs. an established power, and some people have begun to call China and the U.S. “the Athens and Sparta of today” and think the two would fall into the “Thucydides’s Trap”, namely the rising China and the established U.S. would inevitably go to conflicts, and even wars.
Another different version but with almost the same conclusion about the inevitable conflicts between China and the U.S. stresses the divergence of political ideology and institutions between two countries and regards it as a key variable and underlying source of friction.
2. The current Chinese focus is on new China-U.S. relations, especially on the Asia-Pacific affairs and economic relations. For obvious reasons, the Chinese want to work with the United States on the three basic principles: no conflicts or confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. According to Chinese Foreign Minister Mr. Wang Yi’s speech at the Brookings Institution on September 20, 2013, the Chinese government needs to “prioritize our cooperation on Asia-Pacific affairs and start the building of this new model of relationship from the Asia-Pacific region.” However, in my opinion, these regional efforts should be incorporated into China’s global strategy and pave the way for better and more effective global governance. In a word, think globally and act regionally.
In terms of economic relations, I think it is proper here to talk about the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Area. At the China-U.S. Strategic & Economic Dialogue in the past July the two sides agreed to take Shanghai Pilot FTA as a promoter for investment, service industry and more importantly the transformation of management and administration. Based on the negative list, the two countries will start substantial negotiation on Business Investment Treaty (BIT). Furthermore the Chinese government wants the Shanghai FTA should be repeatable and applicable throughout China. This is a continuation of China’s integration into the international community after its formal entering into the WTO on December 11th, 2001. All these have shown the concrete impacts of the New Model of China-U.S. relations.
3. China does not want a G-2 or opposing blocs of major powers. China has always been opposed to the idea of G-2 or “Chinemrica”, which are against the trends of multi-polarization and democratization of international relations. In the same vein, China does not want to form or join opposing blocs. Instead, China wants to carry on the good tradition of BRICS and G-7 in dealing with the financial crisis since 2008. They are the same boat spirits, consultations prior to, in and after the major events, as well as win-win cooperation.
4. Major countries and G-20 should strive for more constructive and effective interaction. Since almost all the major countries are members of G-20, better coordination among them should be taken at top priorities. Looking back at the past five years of mainly combating against global financial crisis and economic difficulties in Europe, the world is to meet the upcoming five years or so of translating the emerging recovery and moderate growth into more sustainable and robust development. In the meantime, the major countries at the G20 and other mechanisms should make redoubled efforts to maintain peace and stability in the world and translate them into better environments for economic and social developments. To certain extent, the legitimacy of G20 comes from its constructive and effective operation for the benefits of the entire international community.
5. Scholars should play a common but differential role with the governments. We are here not to repeat what the governments’ statements, but provide strategic visions, constructive criticisms and feasible recommendations. For instance, we scholars could contribute to eliminate or narrow the gap between the desire for NMMPR and the actual mechanism building, such as the coordination among the traditional, emerging and middle powers. Another example is the contribution of the think tanks to the G20 on its future strategic thinking and practical functioning, such as the true implementation of the reform of IMF and the World Bank.□
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