Iran nuclear talks: interaction without communication

  2010/12/9 source：

The representatives of the P5 1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) and Iran will meet for a new round of discussions in Geneva on December 6. It is hoped the talks will move forward the political process on the nuclear issue which has been stalled for more than a year.  

Although the so-called six-party talks, or the P5 1 mechanism, regarding the Iranian nuclear issue involve the U.S., China, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, European Union and Iran, the dispute is fundamentally between the U.S. and Iran. And given the gulf between the positions of the two countries, the talks will probably once more prove to be an exchange of words without real communication.

Iran claims the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the U.S. recognizes this, but what the two sides mean in practice differs greatly. For the U.S., the Iranian nuclear issue is about proliferation of nuclear weapons and a threat to the U.S.-dominated Middle East security order, as well as US national security. The U.S. regards reducing Iran's enrichment capability to zero as an essential long term objective. When talking about Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, the U.S. actually means peaceful use of nuclear energy without the capability to independently produce nuclear fuel.

Iran regards the nuclear program as a component of its overall modernization program, comprising economic development, technological progress and environmental improvement, as well as potential military considerations. By claiming the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Iranians really mean peaceful use of nuclear energy combined with sovereignty over the capability to produce nuclear fuel, that is, uranium enrichment. Suspicious of others' motives, Iran is extremely unlikely to let control of its supply of nuclear fuel fall into the hands of other powers. From the Iranian point of view, such a prospect would render Iran susceptible to international pressure under any number of scenarios.

The gap between the positions of the U.S. and Iran has existed from the outset and has not been narrowed in advance of the Geneva talks, despite mounting political and economic pressure on Iran resulting from four rounds of sanctions. Secretary of State Clinton told the BBC that Iranians could enrich uranium at some future date once they have demonstrated that they can do so in a responsible manner in accordance with their international obligations. Though her statement seemed to introduce a new element into the discussions, the Iranians may regard it as no more than lip-service, since the U.S. will retain the full authority to decide whether Iran's nuclear program passes the test of transparency.

There is no evidence that the two will be able to reach agreement on another pressing subject. In addition to its long term objective, the U.S. also wants to get most of the uranium that Iran has so far produced out of Iran's control through the fuel swap arrangement discussed in October and November of 2009. If the swap succeeds, the U.S. will be able to substantially reduce Iran's stocks of lower-level nuclear fuel. Since the swap is likely to lengthen the time Iran would need to make a nuclear bomb, the U.S. would have more time to pursue a longer-term resolution of the issue.

The swap deal was first proposed in a series of engagements between Iran, the U.S. and the six parties as a whole, in the second half of 2009, but stalled because of differences about the location, amount and stages of the swap. Iran independently signed a swap agreement with Turkey and Brazil on May 17, 2010, two weeks before the passing of UN Security Council resolution 1929, but the deal was not recognized by the U.S. or Europe. Analysts believe that the new round of negotiations will restart where they left off last year. But the gap between the two sides will not be easily narrowed. As mentioned above, the real intention of the U.S. is to remove a significant chunk of Iran's nuclear fuel stocks so as to win more time for further bargaining. The implication is that it is not certain when the U.S. will return enriched uranium to Iran. For the U.S., the longer it can keep the fuel out of Iranian hands, the better the scenario from its point of view.

But the Iranians have said clearly that their stocks of higher-level enriched uranium for medical use will soon run out. In other words, Iran cannot afford to wait too long. Judging by the gaps between the two sides, the U.S. and Iran are likely to treat the talks as a platform for expressing their own positions rather than an opportunity to seriously bargain with each other. It is hard to see how such an exchange of words can deliver real communication.

The year 2009 saw tension ease somewhat on the Iran nuclear issue. As part of his program of reconciliation with the Muslim world, Barack Obama and his team adopted policies that avoided direct and immediate conflict with Iran in the first year of his administration. But faced with increasing domestic pressure from the Republicans, it seems that Obama has not been able to maintain his stance of seeking reconciliation with Iran. In 2010 tensions rose somewhat, although this was not a linear process. We will have to wait and see how long the easing of tension exemplified by the coming Geneva talks will last.